

**To Boldly Go Where No Market Has Gone Before:
Parcel 18 and the Limits to Progressive Local Land-Use Policy**

An Essay Presented

by

Jed David Kolko

to

The Committee on Degrees in Social Studies

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for a degree with honors
of Bachelor of Arts

Harvard College
March 1992

May 29, 1992

Juan -

Here it is. It was quite well received by my department, and I am considering turning (some of) it into a journal article. I would appreciate your comments and ideas.

Again, my new phone and address are:

Jed David Kolke
1830 S Street, NW
Washington DC 20009
(202) 265-8797.

I look forward to hearing from you soon. Hope your summer starts well.

Jed

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My research depended on the help and generosity of Juan-Carlos Loveluck at the Boston Redevelopment Authority and Senator Paul Harold. I am also grateful to Muhammad Abdus-Sabur, Alan Altshuler, Tony Bethel, Bruce Bolling, Michael Dukakis, Beverley Johnson, Ricardo Millett, Jeanne Pinado, Alden Raine, and Phil Shapiro for their candid and comprehensive interviews.

John Patterson, Mike Grunwald, and Eric Rice gave me invaluable comments. I thank them for their insight and their perspectives.

My roommates were with me all the way through. I thank Mark Wiedman for bonding at all hours, and I thank Jon Gross and Mike Grunwald for their caretaking and for cleaning the room.

I am blessed with the companionship of Eric Rice, who provided that just-right combination of sympathy, encouragement, goofiness, and love.

I am indebted to Bob Ross for advising this thesis. He was all things with grace and skill: structural theorist, political junkie, textual editor, and mentor. In finishing this thesis I only regret that my education under him will soon end.

Finally, I thank my parents for my education, both at Harvard and beyond. It was they who introduced me to my first cities.

PREFACE

In this thesis I attempt two tasks: I present a case study of Parcel 18, and I offer a theoretical argument about the economic constraints on local progressive land-use policy. The argument arises directly from the case study.

At times, I present the case study in greater detail than the theoretical argument requires, though not at the expense of the clarity or coherence of the argument. I do so because my account of Parcel 18 is the only complete historical record of the project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	
Preface	
Table of Contents	
Acronyms Frequently Used	
Maps	
Introduction	1
Chapter One: Theories of the Urban Political Economy	7
Economic Constraint Theories I: Harvey	8
Economic Constraint Theories II: Friedman	12
Economic Constraint Theories III: Peterson	16
Political Coalition Theories I: Background and Foundations	19
Political Coalition Theories II: Swanstrom and Stone	20
Chapter Two: Political Development and Development Politics	24
1950-1967: Back to Downtown: Manifestations of Downtown- Neighborhood Rivalry	24
1967-1983: The White Years, and the Black Community	27
1983: Linkage Payments and the Power of the Neighborhoods	31
1983-1992: Boston Under Flynn	33
Chapter Three: From Highway Plans to Development Plans	39
The Southwest Corridor	39
Obstacles to Development	42
The Theory of Parcel-to-Parcel Linkage	46
The BRA's Vision	50
Selecting a Developer	54
Chapter Four: Public Politicization	58
The MWRA Needs a New Home	58
Choosing Parcel 18	62
Fighting at the Statehouse	66
Attempts at Compromise	70
The MWRA Thinks Again	72
Chapter Five: Parcel 18 Unlinked?	77
The Formal Agreements	77
Still Trying to Attract the Private Sector	81
Back to the Statehouse	83

No More Looking for Tenants in All the Wrong Places	88
Falling Short of Expectations	90
Chapter Six: Progressive Policy and Urban Theory	95
The Bottom Line?	95
The Economic Constraint Theorists Have Their Say	98
Where Politics Mattered	102
Reconstructing Urban Theory	106

Notes

Appendix: Some Real Estate Terms

Note on Sources

Works Cited


List of Tables (tables follow the given page)

Table 1: Boston City and Metropolitan Area Population, 1940-1990	25
Table 2: Boston City Government Revenue Sources, 1950-1985	31
Table 3: Median Family Income for City of Boston, Compared to Metropolitan and National Income	33
Table 4: Private Nonfarm Employment by Sector, Suffolk County	33
Table 5: Boston Neighborhoods, Ranked by 1980 Median Family Income	33
Table 6: Roxbury and Boston Compared	33
Table 7: The Boston Office Market: Construction, Change in Total Value, Average Rents, and Vacancy Rates, 1979-1991	35

ACRONYMS FREQUENTLY USED


BLC	Black Legislative Caucus
BRA	Boston Redevelopment Authority
BTPR	Boston Transportation Planning Review
CAUSE	Community Assembly for a United South End
CDBG	Community Development Block Grant
CPA	Columbia Plaza Associates
DLI	Department of Labor and Industries
MBTA	Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
MCPV	Metropolitan/Columbia Plaza Venture ("the developer")
MWRA	Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
UDAG	Urban Development Action Grant

MAP 1: THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY SUBWAY




Source: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority: System Map. Map. Boston: MBTA, 1988.

MAP 2: PARCEL 18 AND THE CITY OF BOSTON



Source: City of Boston. Boston Redevelopment Authority. Parcel to Parcel Linkage Program: Interim Report: Project 1: Kingston/Bedford Parcel 18. Boston: BRA, 1986.

MAP 3: KINGSTON-BEDFORD AND THE CITY OF BOSTON




Source: City of Boston. Boston Redevelopment Authority. Parcel to Parcel Linkage Program: Interim Report: Project 1: Kingston/Bedford Parcel 18. Boston: BRA, 1986.

MAP 4: BOSTON'S NEIGHBORHOODS




Source: City of Boston. Boston Redevelopment Authority. Roxbury Neighborhood Profile 1988. By Alexander Ganz. Boston: BRA, 1988. Pub. 323.

MAP 5: BOSTON'S HIGHWAY SYSTEM TODAY
(WITH THE CANCELLED SOUTHWEST EXPRESSWAY DRAWN IN)



Source: Glassman, Alfred. Universal Atlas of Metropolitan Boston and Eastern Massachusetts. Stoughton, MA: Universal Publishing, 1983.

MAP 6: PARCEL 18 AND VICINITY



Source: City of Boston. Boston Redevelopment Authority. Development Prospectus for Southwest Corridor Parcel 18 and Kingston-Bedford Garage Site. Boston: BRA, 1985.

MAP 7: THE BOSTON OFFICE MARKET

CLASS A OFFICE MARKETS IN DOWNTOWN BOSTON



Source: City of Boston. Boston Redevelopment Authority. The Boston Class A Office Market, Third Quarter 1991 and Quarterly Projections, 1991-1996. By Robert Amatruda. Boston: BRA, 1991. Pub. 429.

INTRODUCTION

I got off the Orange Line of the Boston subway at Ruggles station, in Roxbury. The neighborhood seemed oddly quiet. Just five minutes earlier I had been in the center of downtown, and I could still make out the windows of the downtown skyscrapers that had been directly above me. From Ruggles Station, I could have walked to the Museum of Fine Arts in five minutes, or to Northeastern University in less than one. Directly in front of me, though, I saw acres of vacant land that should have belonged to a farm or a rural town many miles from there.

Between the land and me was a fence, suggesting that the land might soon be put to some purpose. Where the fence turned the corner was a sign announcing "Ruggles Center," a future development of offices, retail space, and a hotel. The neighborhood surrounding the vacant land consisted mostly of housing projects and large institutions -- this proposed office center seemed to belong to a downtown intersection or business center, not to a low-income inner-city neighborhood. The promise of this future project seemed almost as incongruous as the vacant land in the first place.

One could find vacant land in many American cities, often caused by decades of disinvestment in poor neighborhoods. While such land is sometimes used for playgrounds or makeshift parklands and gardens, inner-city neighborhoods often have a pressing need for housing, retail establishments, and employment.

The vacant land at Ruggles Station has been vacant since the late 1960's. It is called Parcel 18, a 5.1-acre plot bounded by Ruggles Street, Tremont Street, and Melnea Cass Boulevard in Roxbury. Its development has been a goal of the Roxbury community since the mid-1970's and of the

city and state governments since the early 1980's. It has had the consistent support of Boston Mayor Ray Flynn and Massachusetts Governors Michael Dukakis and William Weld. Working against this development, though, has been a history of disinvestment in Roxbury, the center of Boston's black community and the poorest of Boston's sixteen neighborhoods. A combination of the fear of crime, alleged discriminatory lending practices, and the lack of surrounding economic activity has discouraged public and private investment in the area.

Parcel 18 was not always vacant. In the 1960's, the Massachusetts government cleared a five-mile stretch of land called the Southwest Corridor to make way for the construction of a new highway connecting Boston to its southwestern suburbs. Public opposition prevented the construction of this highway, and the new Orange Line of the subway was constructed in its place. The demolition of buildings in the corridor, though, left a long linear path of vacant land along the subway. Much of the land is now landscaped parkland, and other parts have been used for Roxbury Community College and other developments. Parcel 18 is one of the last unused segments of the Southwest Corridor.

In 1985 the Flynn and Dukakis administrations agreed on a plan to develop Parcel 18. The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), the public agent for development, "linked" Parcel 18 to a city-owned parcel of land in the Chinatown/downtown area. According to the plan, whoever developed the downtown site would also have to develop Parcel 18 -- this was called "parcel-to-parcel linkage." This downtown land, the Kingston-Bedford garage site, was expected to be quite profitable, since the demand for office space in Boston was climbing, and the Kingston-Bedford site was in the then-booming downtown Financial District. The profits from the downtown project would

subsidize the development of Parcel 18. As part of the program, the public sector would offer numerous subsidies and incentives, including reduced land costs, public sector tenancy at Parcel 18, and the involvement of a minority developer.

Parcel-to-parcel linkage was part of a more general scheme to bring together the interests of downtown with those of the neighborhoods. Historically, the tension between downtown and the neighborhoods has shaped Boston city politics, and Mayor Flynn hoped to transcend this rivalry and formulate a development policy that was both growth-oriented and redistributive. In 1983 the city adopted a linkage payments policy, which required developers of large commercial projects to contribute to a housing construction fund. Parcel-to-parcel linkage was seen as an extension of linkage payments. Whereas linkage payments were based on schemes developed in other cities, parcel-to-parcel linkage was unique to Boston.

The development of Parcel 18 has not gone quite as planned. The project has not found private sector tenants, and instead it has focused on finding a public sector agency as a tenant. The Registry of Motor Vehicles signed a lease with the developer in 1991, and construction of the first building in the complex is scheduled to begin in the spring of 1992. However, the development of the "linked" downtown site (to be called One Lincoln Street) has not begun, either. The Boston office market, booming during the mid-1980's, collapsed in the late 1980's. Because parcel-to-parcel linkage was structured so that downtown development profits would be shared with Roxbury, the downtown office bust has threatened the original redistributive goals of the project.

Much of urban theory deals with the relationships between economic conditions and local political actions. Roughly speaking, the theories fall into

two camps. The first claims that economic constraints place relatively narrow limits on the ability of local governments to achieve redistributive goals. While these theories vary in their specifics, they tend to include the argument that the need to support growth in cities interferes with redistributive initiatives. The second group of theories focuses more on urban political coalitions and personalities. They claim that redistributive policy is possible when certain political conditions permit, such as the election of progressive coalitions or the absence of a strong business elite.

The history of Parcel 18 resists both models. The "political coalition theories" cannot explain the importance of economic conditions in shaping the project's history. These theories focus on policy formation only, and look at the intentions rather than the effects of policy. Parcel 18 occasions a somewhat more subtle criticism of the "economic constraint theories." At first glance, the history of Parcel 18 appears to support their conclusion that economic constraints make local redistributive policy difficult, if not impossible. A closer analysis suggests, however, that the economic constraints facing Parcel 18 did not work quite as those theories would expect.

This case study provokes a reformulation of the notion of urban economic constraints. I argue that local policy-makers, while influenced strongly by economic conditions, have more autonomy in achieving redistributive goals than the structural theories of economic constraints suggest. In chapter one, I discuss the theoretical context of the argument. I offer a brief definition of progressive local land-use policy, and I describe the two camps of urban theory. Chapter two provides a short history of Boston politics since World War II. I explain repeating patterns in Boston's electoral and development politics, and I offer a discussion of the linkage payments policy that gave rise to parcel-to-parcel linkage. I focus especially on the

history of black politics and the Roxbury neighborhood, and I end with a description of the downtown Boston office market.

Chapters three, four, and five are the story of Parcel 18. In chapter three I describe the conflict over the highway construction and the early plans for Parcel 18's development. I also outline the rationale for the parcel-to-parcel linkage program and describe the original vision for the program. Chapter four deals with the best-known segment of Parcel 18's history: the legislative debate over signing the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) as an anchor tenant. I examine the breakdown of the previously uncontroversial planning process, as well as the motives and interests of key political figures. Then, in chapter five I describe the project's return to relative political calm and the later stages in the planning process. There I focus on the effects of office market conditions on the project, showing how economic conditions "unlinked" the project at least in the short-term.

In chapter six I clarify the economic constraints that influenced Parcel 18, while demonstrating that political skill and initiative played a role in determining the project's outcome. I use these findings to provide a critique of both theoretical approaches outlined in chapter one. Then, I attempt to define a theoretical space for progressive local policy, acknowledging both economic constraints and a degree of autonomy among local policy-makers. My argument has three parts. First, I argue that economic constraints are neither as universal nor as permanent as the economic constraint theories suggest. Second, I argue that the economic constraints on redistribution are multidimensional rather than singular. This claim gives the politics of planning some autonomy in structuring redistributive policy. Third, I argue that growth and redistribution need not be in opposition. Instead, cities can

achieve growth and redistribution simultaneously with projects like the development of Parcel 18.

CHAPTER ONE: THEORIES OF THE URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Parcel 18 was "the most completely political project I've ever been involved in," recalls Governor Dukakis's Secretary of Economic Affairs, Alden Raine.¹ The development of Parcel 18 involved the politicization of the Boston land market to an unprecedented degree. The relationship between state activity and market forces changed during the planning and implementation of the policy: state activity tried to harness and redirect market activity, but in turn it became shaped and limited by those same market forces.

While much social theory deals with the relationship between the state and the market, urban social theory provides models for these interactions that are particular to local politics and market forces. Of the factors that contribute to the unique "urbanness" of urban political economy, three are especially relevant to the history of Parcel 18. First, urban areas are rarely economically independent. Cities are affected by regional, national, and global economic conditions. Both capital and labor are more mobile between cities than they are between nations, and forces beyond a city's direct control, such as firms' investment decisions, can affect the flow of capital and labor into and out of cities. Second, urban areas are part of a larger intergovernmental system. Cities often depend on federal and state aid, and their political and revenue-generating powers are usually determined at the state level.

For these two reasons, urban theorists generally consider cities to be bound by constraints, and these theories ascribe to city governments less autonomy than they might to the federal or state governments. But the third factor contributing to the unique "urbanness" of urban political economy is a tool rather than a constraint. The American system of government leaves to

cities direct control over land-use policy. Cities generally have the right to levy property taxes and establish zoning codes, and local politics often focuses on the rate of urban development and the distribution of the costs and benefits of various land uses. Urban social theorists refer repeatedly to land-use policy as a key element in city politics.

Throughout this chapter, I will consider how a progressive land-use policy like Parcel 18 fits into several theoretical frameworks. I define a progressive land-use policy as an initiative related to property taxes, zoning codes, or other regulations directly affecting the built environment, that has significant redistributive elements. Progressive land-use policies attempt to assign the costs and/or benefits of urban development in a manner that increases the equality of wealth among city residents.

In this discussion, I present first the "economic constraint theories." These theories suggest that economic conditions impose limits on local redistribution, even to the point of preventing the formulation of local progressive policy. These theories include those of the structural Marxist David Harvey, the market economist Milton Friedman, and the political theorist Paul Peterson. I then present the "political coalition theories." These theories focus more on political actors and less on economic constraints, and they allow the formulation of progressive local policy given the existence of progressive leadership. In this second camp I include the theories of political theorists Todd Swanstrom and Clarence Stone.

ECONOMIC CONSTRAINT THEORIES I: HARVEY

The first of the economic constraint theorists is David Harvey. He offers an example of a Marxist explanation for the workings of the urban political economy. There are other Marxists who focus less on economic

constraints and more on the effects of class struggle -- I do not consider Harvey representative of all urban Marxists. To distinguish the Marxists who, like Harvey, emphasize the economic constraints on state action, I shall refer to them as "structural Marxists."

Harvey argues that the production of the built environment is economically determined by the logic of capital. Under capitalism, capitalists reap excess profits as the productivity of labor increases. Harvey explains that the competition between capitalists for excess profit leads to overaccumulation, the condition when "too much capital is produced in aggregate relative to the opportunities to employ that capital."²

Marx, says Harvey, mistakenly assumed that all commodities are produced and consumed within a single time period. Harvey refers to the production and consumption of goods with a single time period as the primary circuit of capital. Harvey argues that excess capital in the primary circuit can flow into a secondary circuit of capital, which is a fixed asset and consumption fund that includes infrastructure and the built environment. If excess capital accumulates in the secondary circuit, it flows into the tertiary circuit, which includes scientific, technological, and educational investment. These second and third circuits of capital expand the basis for capital accumulation in society.³

From the flow of capital into the secondary and tertiary circuits comes the "pervasive tendency toward overinvestment" in those circuits. When further investment in the built environment is no longer productive, the built environment becomes devalued, and further investment in the secondary circuit can come only by clearing away former investments to make room for new investment.⁴ A physical asset fixes production at a specific level and "imprisons and inhibits the accumulation process" accordingly.

Thus, capital must "negotiate a knife-edge path between preserving the exchange values of past capital investments ... and destroying the value of these investments."⁵ This "rhythm" of overaccumulation and devaluation determines the shape of the built environment.⁶

To the rhythmic logic of overaccumulation, Harvey adds a theory of urban class struggle. In the city, capital invokes three methods to diffuse and disguise the class struggle between capitalists and workers. First is the call for "community improvement" by urban reformers, who "promote a doctrine of community harmony in the face of realities of class struggle" and try unsuccessfully to control social discontent by appealing to a fictitious place-based interest instead of a class-based interest.⁷ Second is the tendency for cities to compete for capital investment, thus allowing the bourgeoisie to spatially "divide and rule" the working class. Third are the "bourgeois promptings" that inflame ethnic, religious, and racial tensions and further divide the working class.⁸

In Harvey's analysis, capital places stiff constraints on political activity. The state exists in order to maintain and reproduce the capitalist system. The competition among cities for capital serves to "discipline any urban-based class alliance to common capitalist requirements." The "successful ruling-class alliance has to be, in spirit as well as in practice, a procapitalist class alliance," and it must "accommodate to the basic logic of capital circulation and accumulation." The alliance that does not both compete for capital investment and obscure class-based interests by emphasizing place-based interests risks weakening the foundation of its own existence.⁹

Because capital provides the social and economic context for political activity, and because this context is "given, not chosen," Harvey lists only three roles for the capitalist state, unfortunately with little elaboration: to act

as a "crisis-manager" by facilitating smooth capital flows; to create the conditions for "balanced growth"; and to "contain civil strife and factional struggle by repression, cooptation, or integration."

Harvey rejects critics who argue that orthodox Marxism denies politics any autonomy. In fact, he argues that "'relative autonomy' is not only compatible with but also necessary to the processes of capital accumulation."¹⁰ This relative autonomy consists of the state's ability to formulate innovative policies designed to attract capital investment, such as building infrastructure, structuring tax systems favorable to business, and so on. Innovation can be wide-ranging, and it includes not only innovation in production but also innovation in consumption, such as transit and services improvements that satisfy the labor force.¹¹ The capitalist state thus rewards local political entrepreneurs, as long as their political innovations satisfy the demands of capital.

The capitalist state also responds to the pressures of class struggle. Tension and protest can "change the structure of investment flows to the advantage of the working class."¹² This argument would seem to open a theoretical space for progressive policy by the capitalist state. Harvey then adds, however, that a rechanneling of investment toward the benefit of the working class happens only if it does not threaten the overall tendency toward capital accumulation. Such a rechanneling could only be temporary -- when any progressive redistribution scheme begins to interfere with the logic of capital, the capitalist state dismantles the program.

Ultimately, Harvey claims, innovative state policies have only two possible eventual outcomes: repression by "forces of reaction" or revolution by the working class.¹³ The structural Marxists doubt the capitalist state's ability to achieve progressive goals that run counter to the long-run needs of

capital. Permanent and meaningful redistribution comes only with the replacement of the capitalist state and system. The "struggle to abolish the wages system and the domination of capital over labor must necessarily look to the day when the capitalist laws of accumulation are themselves relegated to the history books."¹⁴

Harvey's argument pits the needs of capital against progressive local policy. As one critic puts it, Marxist theory places an "overemphasis on zero-sum class struggles between capitalists and workers."¹⁵ The logic of capital limits local policy to those initiatives that facilitate capital accumulation in the local area.

Regarding Parcel 18 specifically, Harvey would expect that either (1) the policy was not truly progressive and actually would have benefitted capitalists while diffusing class struggle, or (2) the policy was perhaps truly progressive and therefore threatening to capital, and for that reason ultimately became impossible to achieve. He would say that the logic of capital is an economic constraint that precludes effective local progressive policy.

ECONOMIC CONSTRAINT THEORIES II: FRIEDMAN

The market economists begin with Adam Smith, who argues that a market economy is a natural social arrangement, arising from the "propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another."¹⁶ The theory of the market economy is based on voluntary individual exchange, coordinated by prices. Market economists argue that private enterprise leads to an "efficient allocation of resources." That is, competitive markets lead to Pareto optimality, the equilibrium condition under which no one could be made better off without making someone else worse off. Were it possible to make someone better off without hurting someone else, then a trade or series of

trades would voluntarily and spontaneously occur to accomplish this.¹⁷ Many neoclassical economic models involve only private actors, with government involvement an exogenous influence that interrupts smooth market function.

This market-centered view of economic life prescribes a relatively narrow and specific role for government. Perhaps the most prominent modern market economist is Milton Friedman. He argues for strict limits on government involvement in economic life. He is concerned with the abuse of power that can result if political and economic power are concentrated in the same people, and he views competitive capitalism as a means to economic freedom that effectively separates economic and political power. To maintain this separation, economic life should operate only by cooperation, not coercion, and the government should only "determine, arbitrate, and enforce the rules of the game" in which it is not itself a player.¹⁸

When the government acts as more than "a forum and an umpire" for the market system, economic and social activity suffers. "The use of political channels, while inevitable, tends to strain the social cohesion essential for a stable society," for majority interests may develop policy goals that ignore the interests of the minority, and political involvement is a less "impersonal" system of allocating resources than the free market.¹⁹

There are cases, Friedman admits, when the negative effects of government intervention are necessary evils. Natural monopoly often requires government regulation to keep prices low. The neighborhood effects or "externalities" of economic activities -- effects of voluntary transactions on unwilling third parties, such as air pollution -- often require the government to enforce compensation. Pure public goods, like defense, from which everyone benefits whether they actually pay for it or not, often require

government provision. But, he warns, "Every act of government intervention limits the area of individual freedom directly," and there is little justification for government economic activity outside of those enumerated market failures.²⁰ "Market failure" is a technical economic term for the conditions that prevent the achievement of Pareto optimality.²¹ Inequality (of wealth or income) is not included in Friedman's list of market failures.

Most notably, Friedman sees little room for redistributive and other social welfare policies by the government. Redistribution is inefficient: allocation "in accordance with product [rather than need] is ... necessary in order that resources be used most effectively."²² Even less strict market economists consider efficiency (that is, aggregate wealth) and equity to be in opposition, such that any increase in equity requires trading off some level of efficiency.²³ To the extent that market economists seek to discover the patterns that maximize economic efficiency, market economics resembles structural Marxism in suggesting a relatively zero-sum game between growth and redistribution.

To the extent that inequality is a problem, says Friedman, much of it has been the result of government regulation, through granting monopolies, setting tariffs, and a tax regime that is "arbitrary in its impact." Redistribution is "another example of the justification of government intervention in terms of alleged defects of the private enterprise system when many of the phenomena of which champions of big government complain are themselves the creation of government, big and small." Thus, society should strive to achieve "equality of rights" rather than "material equality or equality of outcome."²⁴

If government must act to alleviate pressing poverty problems, Friedman continues, government programs should carefully target the poor

and use market mechanisms. Programs must avoid targeting people of a certain race, or in a specific area, for the benefits of those programs tend to be captured by better-off people who live in the targeted area or belong to the targeted race. He advocates income supplements: a negative income tax, school tuition vouchers, and the like. These programs prevent government paternalism and do not "force people to act against their own immediate interests in order to promote a supposedly general interest."²⁵

Though Friedman does not discuss urban policy directly, it is easy to extend his free-market theory to urban land use, as other market economists have done. The pattern of land use in a city arises when a "firm chooses the location that maximizes its profit, and a household chooses the location that maximizes its utility."²⁶ The price of the most desirable land gets bid up until only the most profitable form of investment (i.e. office buildings, in most American cities) takes place there; successively less profitable land uses (retail, institutional, housing, in some order) occupy successively less desirable land, as determined by proximity to city center, employment centers, or infrastructure. If land can support productive activity, it will command a price in the marketplace. If land is vacant, eventually the price will fall low enough to attract some use.

Friedman would not advocate subsidizing the development of specific land as a redistributive measure. Since the free market allocates resources efficiently, vacant land in a properly-functioning land market indicates that no productive activity can take place there, because of its location or other characteristics. If the vacant land is part of a larger problem of a depressed area, then appropriate policies would include measures that facilitate mobility out of the depressed area (either mobility to find jobs elsewhere or to move elsewhere), or measures that raise people's incomes directly so they can

choose to move away or to develop the vacant land collectively. Friedman would consider place-based redistributive policies inequitable and coercive: such policies might not target the poor, and such policies would limit the choices investors and developers face. While Friedman does not argue that progressive local policy is impossible, he considers it undesirable. His wariness of government action might make him decide that government's solution to vacant land would make society, and even the proximate poor, worse off than the free-market solution.

ECONOMIC CONSTRAINT THEORIES III: PETERSON

Paul Peterson offers a specific theory of local politics that is in the tradition of the market economists. Like the market economists, he argues that economic self-interest is the dominant force in society. He extends this dominance of economic self-interest to cities themselves, causing one critic to call Peterson's view the theory of "the city as a corporate entity."²⁷ The "primary interest" of American cities is the "maintenance and enhancement of their economic productivity. To their land area cities must attract productive labor and capital."²⁸ Because of the strength of the city's interest, "policy choices over time will be limited to those few which can plausibly be shown to be conducive to the community's economic prosperity."²⁹

The city's interest is not simply the aggregation of the residents' interests; residents' interests are diverse, changing, and usually unknown. Still, the city's interest reflects that of its people, for residents "share an interest in policies that affect the well-being of that territory."³⁰

Peterson offers a policy typology to make his case. He divides the world of potential local policies into developmental, allocational, and redistributive policies, each corresponding to the economic benefit or harm that they bring

to the city. Roughly, developmental policies attract or enhance economic activity, allocational policies do not affect overall economic activity, and redistributive policies have an "adverse economic effect." While many policies do not conform neatly to these ideal classifications, Peterson asserts that most policies tend to fit one category.³¹

For each category of policy, there tends to be a different political process for policy formulation and implementation. For the most part developmental politics are characterized by elite power structures, rather than public pluralist politics. The economic benefits of developmental policies make them unambiguously in the city's interest, says Peterson. It is "of great benefit ... if the formal governmental leadership also provides legitimacy for the policy," but technical experts and independent public or quasi-public authorities outside the public eye tend to control the promulgation of developmental policy.³²

On the other hand, allocational politics are "characteristically pluralist," with different interest groups and individuals fighting for "concrete and material" benefits that have "no known effect on the overall economic interests of the city." Allocational politics involve the politics of providing services and of municipal employment policies, as well as other resource allocations. Formal local government structures are the arena for allocational politics. Because the public often considers allocational issues provincial and petty, "the power over these allocational issues exercised by small groups is particularly potent," such as municipal employee unions and ethnic/racial minorities.³³

Redistributive policies, unlike the first two categories, rarely find expression in any part of the local government system. Recall that Peterson defines redistributive policies as harmful to the city's economic interests.

Peterson also defines redistributive policies as those where the costs are borne by different people than those who benefit from the policies, such as hospital spending and welfare programs.³⁴ It is not the case that business interests or other actors actively try to block redistributive issues from arising; rather, economic constraints impose "sharp limits" on redistributive policy.³⁵

When public opinion or protests pressure the government to focus on redistributive issues, "those responsible for protecting the interests of the city devise political strategies that enable the city to avoid implementing substantial redistributions."³⁶ Cities often delay their response until public opinion quiets, or convert the redistributive issue into an allocational issue or into a political issue. Conversion of redistributive issues can include implementing experimental programs, which cost the city little yet satisfy immediate demands for change; identifying "group leaders and giving them special concessions"; or imposing political reform that gives the protest group more political power at no monetary cost to the city.³⁷

Overall, Peterson considers local government unable to formulate redistributive policy. Peterson checks his pessimism by suggesting that large cities with "monopolistic control" over much land can occasionally implement redistribution. Also, cities in strong fiscal health can sometimes offer temporary redistributive measures, but only as long as fiscal strength persists.³⁸ But Peterson does not elaborate on these points, and they do not constitute his primary theoretical ideas. He argues that redistributive policies increasingly become the responsibility of the federal government, and that only the federal government can loosen some of the constraints that local governments face. For instance, he believes that if the federal government backed all local debt, established a revenue-sharing system to equalize local tax revenues, and set minimum local service standards, then local

governments might be able to set redistributive policies.³⁹ He acknowledges the small chances of these reforms, and can offer no other prescription for redistributive policy at the local level.

Thus, in spite of the differences between their theories, Harvey, Friedman, and Peterson consider urban politics to be tightly constrained by economics. They believe that economic constraints prevent redistributive policy formulation. The second camp of theorists, the political coalition theorists, argue instead that local political processes can play a significant role in formulating and implementing progressive land-use policy, and I now turn to those theorists.

POLITICAL COALITION THEORIES I: BACKGROUND AND FOUNDATIONS

I refer to Swanstrom and Stone collectively as "political coalition theorists" -- not because they are unique in their argument that local politics involves political coalitions, but because they place an emphasis on the autonomy of these coalitions in determining local policy. Unlike Harvey, Friedman, and Peterson, they do not argue that growth and redistribution are opposite sides of a zero-sum game. Thus, they create a theoretical space for progressive land-use policy.

Before examining their theories, I offer some theoretical context. I mention the theories of John Logan, Harvey Molotch, and John Mollenkopf not as examples of political coalition theorists but as context for the discussion of the political coalition theorists Swanstrom and Stone.

Logan and Molotch introduce the idea of local "growth machines," made up of urban elites aligned with political leaders who share a desire for growth. The "activism of entrepreneurs," both in the private and public sectors, is necessary for the growth machine to function, and cities with

weaker elites tend not to have such strong pro-growth tendencies. Public support for local growth is important, but the existence of a powerful urban elite is essential.⁴⁰ Although Logan and Molotch doubt that growth machines ever formulate progressive policy, they differ from the economic constraint theorists because they attribute the lack of progressivity in local policy to conservative political actors and not to economic constraints.

John Mollenkopf agrees that pro-growth coalitions have dominated American local politics in recent decades. But unlike Logan and Molotch, Mollenkopf argues that pro-growth coalitions are "not operating according to some class-conscious scheme" and are not necessarily controlled by or composed of local elites. These coalitions are driven more by the "political logic" of bringing together different bases of power than by the "economic logic" of promoting fiscal health, though both are important. "Political entrepreneurs" forge these coalitions, and their success depends on the "political skills and leadership" of the politician. Thus, government can "reorganize the constellation of private interests." And the recent weakening of pro-growth coalitions is due not to poor economic performance but rather to political controversies that many pro-growth policies have engendered.⁴¹

Mollenkopf sees a "great vacuum" in urban local politics, which has followed the weakening of traditional pro-growth coalitions. In many cities, neighborhood groups are poised to be included in new local coalitions that would be more progressive than the earlier pro-growth coalitions.⁴²

POLITICAL COALITION THEORIES II: SWANSTROM AND STONE

Following Mollenkopf's model, Todd Swanstrom describes a "new style of mayoral leadership" that has filled the vacuum left by weakening pro-growth coalitions. He refers to such mayors as "urban populists," whose goals

include a greater emphasis on redistribution by sharing downtown wealth with neighborhoods, rather than focusing simply on aggregate growth. Swanstrom considers market constraints less restrictive than the economic constraint theorists or even Logan and Molotch do.⁴³

The success of urban populists depends partly on economic factors, for the mayor of a booming city can trade off some growth in aggregate terms for the sake of redistribution more easily than the mayor of a city less in demand. However, more important to the success of urban populists are "political styles": the urban populist who builds a progressively-minded coalition is more likely to be reelected than the urban populist who employs a more confrontational style.⁴⁴ While Swanstrom's theory of urban populists' success may seem like mere common-sense, it suggests that lasting, progressive ruling coalitions are possible, since they depend primarily on a skillful, populist-minded political entrepreneur.

Like Swanstrom's, Clarence Stone's theory of urban politics follows Mollenkopf's and rejects strict economic constraints. Stone contributes a classification and comparison of urban ruling regimes. He makes explicit Swanstrom's implicit suggestion that progressive coalitions are possible. He argues with Peterson's notion of cities' single-minded pursuit of economic gain. Stone views the city as an "arena of multiple imperatives," as often political as economic, that results in conflict and coalition-building. Unlike Logan and Molotch, Stone does not claim that these coalitions necessarily form along particular class lines.⁴⁵

A regime "represents an accommodation between the potentially conflicting principles of the popular control of government and the private ownership of business enterprises." Each regime type tends to promote a characteristic attitude toward land-use policy, and "any operational notion of

the community's collective good seems to be given shape by the 'prevailing coalition.' Land-use policy is therefore not something that is calculated to serve the interest of an abstraction called 'the community.'"⁴⁶

Stone's regimes are ideal types, and there are three. The "corporate coalition" tends to further downtown development interests and reflects a concentration of power that can often keep development policy out of public debate. Corporate coalitions tend to use public resources to subsidize investment, shift development costs to the public sector, and concentrate development benefits in the private sector. These coalitions are most similar to Logan and Molotch's growth machines.

"Caretaker coalitions" rest on the support of small-property owners and small businesspeople. These coalitions are a "force for passivity," and more than other coalitions they try to restrict government involvement in the local economy through referenda, ward-based politics, and other veto powers. Caretaker coalitions favor free market transactions, minimizing development costs (rather than trying to shift them to either the public or private sector), and using development benefits to maintain low tax rates.

"Progressive coalitions" are similar to corporate coalitions in their reliance on active public involvement in land-use politics. The progressive coalitions tend to use public resources to foster equality, shift development costs to the private sector, and capture development benefits for the public sector to allocate. Progressive coalitions vary widely, and their policies often depend on whether their base of support is working-class neighborhoods or liberal middle-class interests. They depend on "strong ideological commitment" among public officials and voters. Stone admits that progressive coalitions tend to be less stable than corporate and caretaker

coalitions, for they depend more on "active citizen involvement." Still, Stone provides a model for successful progressive land-use policy-making.⁴⁷

Swanstrom and Stone create a theoretical opportunity for the formulation of local progressive policy. Their optimism for progressive policy is misguided, however. These political coalition theorists look at the election of politicians and their policies, but do not examine closely the economic effects of these policies. They assume that the formulation of progressive policy guarantees the achievement of its intended effects. As the history of Parcel 18 shows, progressive intentions do not necessarily guarantee progressive effects.

The case study of Parcel 18 provides an attempt to bridge this theoretical gap: Harvey, Friedman, and Peterson argue that local policy can rarely achieve long-lasting progressive goals, while the coalition theorists argue that local progressive policy can be formulated. None of the above theorists combines economic and political factors to conclude adequately that, under certain conditions, local policy can have long-lasting progressive effects. Granted, the obstacles to effective progressive policy are many. But insofar as its effects can be determined, the history of Parcel 18 suggests that local progressive land-use policy may have truly redistributive effects. This finding will force a reworking of the urban theory discussed above, and I will return to that task in the final chapter.

CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT POLITICS

The history of Boston generally follows national trends in urban political and economic evolution. Like other cities, Boston has experienced a growth-oriented leadership, racial conflicts, and increasing gentrification. Yet a confluence of specific local conditions permitted the emergence of progressive development policy in the 1980's. Boston's parcel-to-parcel linkage program arose from a particular set of historical ethnic divisions, political coalitions, and economic constraints.

1950-1967: BACK TO DOWNTOWN: MANIFESTATIONS OF DOWNTOWN-NEIGHBORHOOD RIVALRY

For much of this century, Boston politics have been shaped by downtown-neighborhood rivalry. In the first decades of the 1900's, this rivalry coincided with ethnic rivalry between the Yankees and the Irish. By the 1920's, an Irish Democratic machine controlled Boston city government. The Yankees controlled the state government and tried to limit the powers of city government. But the Irish mayors retaliated by neglecting downtown development and raising taxes on commercial and industrial property in order to fund neighborhood development and public employment. James Curley was the most famous Irish machine mayor, and he served four terms between 1914 and 1950.¹

By the late 1940's, Boston faced an "atmosphere of alarm."² The city was losing population and jobs, as new highways and housing policies encouraged suburbanization.³ This sense of "alarm" gave reformist mayoral candidate John Hynes much support, and he served as mayor from 1950 to 1959. Hynes was not part of the Democratic machine, nor did he wish to exacerbate the downtown-neighborhood rivalry.⁴

During the 1950's, Hynes presided over a city that continued its rapid decline. The population dropped by over one hundred thousand people. Half of this exodus came from the older, inner neighborhoods that previously had supported the Democratic machine. (See table 1.) Downtown became more dilapidated, following its neglect under Curley. From 1930 to 1959, no office buildings were constructed in Boston, and the total value of real estate in the city fell from \$1.8 billion in the late 1920's to \$1.3 billion in 1960, a 28% drop.⁵ The city's decline contrasted with the rise of Boston's suburbs. During the 1950's, the suburbs grew rapidly, spurred by the opening of Route 128, west of the city. Businesses moved out to the suburbs, and suburban employment rose 22% over the decade.⁶

Hynes assembled academic economists, urban planners, and business leaders to try to rebuild downtown Boston. In 1957 Hynes created the BRA as an independent agency. Hynes also maintained a good relationship with Boston's business community. The most influential business leaders met regularly as a group, nicknamed the Vault, which included the heads of Boston's largest banks, retailers, industrial firms, and others.⁷ This influential business coalition still exists today.⁸

In the 1959 mayoral election the Vault helped another non-machine candidate, John Collins, defeat a machine candidate, John Powers. After his election, Collins satisfied many of the Vault's demands: he lowered tax rates; reduced the city budget; and hired a strong director for the BRA, Edward Logue, from the New Haven redevelopment agency. In 1960 the Massachusetts legislature passed a law that helped Logue attract investment. In an attempt to convince the Prudential Insurance Company to create a major mixed-use development in Boston, the legislature passed a law permitting property tax exemptions for development in "blighted, decadent,

TABLE 1:
BOSTON CITY AND METROPOLITAN AREA POPULATION, 1940-1990

	City of Boston	Boston Metropolitan Area	City as percentage of metropolitan area
1940	770,816	2,177,621	36
1950	801,444	2,369,986	34
1960	697,197	2,595,481	27
1970	641,071	2,899,101	22
1980	562,994	3,662,888*	15
1990	574,283	3,783,817	15

* Metropolitan area definition changed in 1980. Thus the increase in population is overstated by these data.

SOURCES: United States. Bureau of the Census. State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1991. Washington: GPO, 1991.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1983. Washington: GPO, 1983.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1972. Washington: GPO, 1973.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1962. Washington: GPO, 1962.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1952. Washington: GPO, 1953.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1949. Washington: GPO, 1952.

and substandard" areas. This law became Chapter 121A of Massachusetts law, and would eventually give property tax exemptions for over a hundred developments, including both housing projects and downtown office construction.⁹

With federal money and local business support, Logue and Collins initiated a great deal of development, most of which was completed after Collins' terms ended in 1967. Logue's projects focused on the central business district and institutional expansion. Logue finished the Prudential Center development, which Mayor Hynes had initiated, and he planned the Government Center, Waterfront, South Station, Downtown Crossing, and Quincy Market developments. While he also initiated housing projects in Washington Park, the South End, and Charlestown, his development activity caused an overall decline in Boston's housing stock. Under Logue from 1960 to 1967, the BRA destroyed 9718 low-rent units and built 3504 new housing units, of which only 982 were federally subsidized to insure low rent.¹⁰

In 1965 the BRA adopted a plan to redevelop the South End according to a new federal emphasis on rehabilitation, not demolition. The relocation and housing rebuilding efforts were not as extensive as promised, though, and many South End residents organized protests to stop the redevelopment. The most famous protest was the 1968 construction of Tent City, a collection of makeshift homes, by the Community Assembly for a United South End (CAUSE) on a parking lot where one hundred poor families' homes had been.¹¹

In response to the South End redevelopment, a "new kind of militant community activism" arose, both to halt demolition to build community-owned and subsidized housing. This activism had immediate political effects, too. The transformation of the South End and the emphasis on

downtown projects again heightened neighborhood resentment against downtown interests. In the 1967 preliminary mayoral election, Logue ran for mayor with the Vault's support but placed only fourth. The CAUSE protests and other community activism hurt Logue's campaign.¹²

1967-1983: THE WHITE YEARS, AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY

Kevin White and Louise Day Hicks faced each other in the fall election. White and Hicks fit less neatly into the neighborhood-downtown rivalry framework. Both candidates had strong neighborhood support. Hicks was considered a white people's populist and appealed to the view that the "time had come for whites to assert themselves" against black migration and federal desegregation requirements. White was a "'non-political' candidate in the tradition of Hynes and Collins," and ran on a more progressive platform to appeal to the growing black neighborhoods and to capitalize on resentment over the South End project. With a coalition of liberals, middle-class Irish, Vault support (after Logue's defeat) and strong black support, White won the 1967 election and served four terms until the end of 1983.¹³

In his first two terms, White managed his coalition of business and neighborhood support successfully. While continuing to push for urban renewal, White heeded the warning of the South End protests and set up Little City Halls in the neighborhoods. These agencies facilitated service delivery and provided the neighborhoods with a nearby representative of the mayor. Input from Little City Halls made White responsive to neighborhood protests over highway construction and institutional expansion. White strongly opposed the construction of the highway through the South End and Roxbury that became the Southwest Corridor and Parcel 18. White also taxed the growth in office development, initiated under Hynes and Collins, to fund

social spending and redistributive programs.¹⁴ White promised civil rights enforcement and visited black neighborhoods often, leading some resentful whites to refer to him as "Mayor Black."¹⁵

Race relations took over Boston politics in White's second term. In 1972 the Boston NAACP helped initiate a suit against the all-white Boston School Committee, charging that segregation still existed within the city schools. Federal Judge W. Arthur Garrity ordered school busing in 1974 to desegregate the schools, and white neighborhoods protested. For two years there were school boycotts, protests, and riots, especially in very-white Charlestown and South Boston. The Justice Department refused to review Garrity's decision.¹⁶ Black leaders criticized Mayor White for not supporting Garrity's decision publicly and loudly enough.¹⁷

While the busing conflict brought race to the top of the political agenda as never before in Boston, Boston's black community had had a long history of growth and political activity. Boston's black population had been centered in Roxbury since the 1940's. During that decade, migration caused the black population almost to double. The black population continued to grow rapidly in the 1950's and 1960's, while much of Boston's white population moved outward. In 1970, blacks were 16% of Boston's population, compared to 5% in 1950. Blacks moved to the edges of then-white Dorchester, Jamaica Plain, Roslindale, and Hyde Park.¹⁸

With increased numbers came increased political protest. Blacks organized in the mid-1960's against Boston's segregated schools, severe housing deterioration, redlining, and urban renewal and highway projects.¹⁹ Perhaps the most famous racial riots in Boston previous to the busing conflict were in Roxbury the night after Martin Luther King Jr. was shot, in April 1968.²⁰

The state legislative redistricting in 1971 resulted in the creation of five black districts in the greater Roxbury area, and these five representatives formed the Massachusetts Black Legislative Caucus (BLC) in 1972, which was, as one historian described it, the "real beginning of institution building."²¹ The major early accomplishment of the BLC was Senate redistricting to create a black Senate district. However, the 1974 Senate election "split the community" as Bill Owens defeated Royal Bolling, Sr., for the seat. Owens was younger and seemed more radical than Bolling, whose political career was more independent of the black community and of black activism.²² Owens's victory represented a challenge to the traditional, established leadership of Boston's black community.

The busing conflict resulted in further political mobilization and activity. In 1977, John O'Bryant became the first black person elected to the Boston School Committee, also gaining much white support. A year later, Mel King and other activists formed the Black Political Task Force to screen and endorse candidates who supported the black community's interests. It played a "major role in socializing and educating the black voter." The BLC was also a voice for black interests at the city level and pressured Mayor White to improve relations between the police and the black community.²³

Mayor White became less progressive in his third and fourth terms, and he reversed many of his pro-neighborhood reforms. By the late 1970's White's dependence on business interests turned him away from "progressive" policies, and he became an opponent of rent control and neighborhood-based development planning. After the busing conflict he believed that the city would benefit from more centralized planning and control, rather than being divided by strong community interests. He focused

more on downtown development and less on neighborhood housing, and in 1981 closed the Little City Halls.²⁴

White's new emphasis on downtown development was encouraged by President Nixon's New Federalism. Congress approved general revenue-sharing in 1972 and Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) in 1974, to replace urban renewal, Model Cities, and other programs. In general, these new grant programs shifted funds to the South, to the West, and from inner cities to suburbs. The new programs gave cities more discretion to move funds from poor or minority neighborhoods to more general uses. White used this new aid less for subsidized housing and more for commercial and homeowner districts. Most of these changes in federal programs ultimately widened the economic disparity between downtown and neighborhoods under White.²⁵

Subsidized housing projects were also hurt by local fiscal crises in 1976 and again in the early 1980's. Because 1975 was an election year, White refused to raise property taxes, and the school desegregation order added unexpected costs to the city's budget. With the credit market shaken by the 1975 New York City fiscal crisis, White was forced to cut back on spending.²⁶ The combination of more aggressive downtown growth and cutbacks in redistributive programs accelerated gentrification in Boston in the late 1970's. Then, in 1979, voters statewide passed Proposition 2 1/2, limiting property taxation to 2.5% of the total real estate value in a jurisdiction, and limiting the growth of property tax revenue to 2.5% per year.

In the first two years after the passage of Proposition 2 1/2, Boston property tax revenue fell by 28%, forcing municipal layoffs and curtailing redistributive programs, while providing tax relief for businesses and developers. The proposition's limit on the growth of property tax revenue

prevented the city from capturing the full increase in land values from commercial development and gentrification, further helping business and downtown and hurting poorer neighborhoods.²⁷ While increased state aid made up some of the lost tax revenue, federal aid also declined. (See table 2.) In the last three years of White's last term (1981-1983), the city was so near bankruptcy that it could not issue long-term bonds.²⁸

Toward the end of White's tenure, neighborhood and community activism rose. Neighborhoods formed their own planning groups and community development corporations in order to combat gentrification, redlining, and the encroachment of institutions such as Logan Airport in East Boston, New England Medical Center in Chinatown, and Harvard Medical Center in the Fenway/Roxbury area.²⁹ In 1982, the Committee for District Representation, a coalition of local activists, proposed a successful referendum that created a new City Council and School Committee, each having nine district and four at-large seats. This reform had been promised and then neglected by White. It reversed the at-large election system that had been in place since 1950 and gave minorities a better chance at representation.³⁰

1983: LINKAGE PAYMENTS AND THE POWER OF THE NEIGHBORHOODS

In the late White years, neighborhoods won some control over commercial development. Community groups protested the development of Copley Place in 1978, demanding that the developer also provide affordable housing and jobs for minorities. Mel King helped lead these protests, and Ray Flynn, a city councillor from South Boston, threatened to oppose the developer's Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) request unless community demands were met. Under King's and Flynn's pressure, the

TABLE 2:
BOSTON CITY GOVERNMENT REVENUE SOURCES, 1950-1985
(ALL DOLLAR FIGURES PER CAPITA, IN 1991 DOLLARS)

	Total revenue	Grant aid* (federal in parentheses)	Percent of revenue from grants	Tax revenue	Percent of revenue from taxes	Percent of tax revenue from property taxes
1950	1374	319	23.2	991	72.1	96.7
1960	1711	425	24.8	1198	70.0	98.1
1970	1957	407	20.8	1276	65.2	98.6
1975	2558	815 (258)	31.9	1270	49.6	99.1
1981	2677	984 (247)	36.7	1348	50.4	98.8
1985	2363	1213 (157)	51.3	809	34.2	94.0

*The main figures all refer to combined federal and state aid. Before 1975, the Census did not break down the source of grant aid.

Note: These tax data do not necessarily reflect changes in business property taxes. The city offers business tax exemptions (121A's), which are negotiated on a case-by-case basis.

SOURCES: United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1988. Washington: GPO, 1988.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1983. Washington: GPO, 1983.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1977. Washington: GPO, 1977.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1972. Washington: GPO, 1973.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1962. Washington: GPO, 1962.

United States. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1952. Washington: GPO, 1953.

developer agreed to make 25% of the housing units low-rent and to set aside construction jobs for Boston residents, minorities, and women.³¹

Several years later, as downtown office construction boomed, City Councillor Bruce Bolling of Roxbury introduced a proposal for linkage. This was based on an existing policy in San Francisco. Bolling proposed that developers be required to build a housing unit for every 1,200 square feet of office construction (corresponding approximately to four employees). The City Council passed the proposal in March 1983, but White vetoed it for fear of discouraging downtown development.

Flynn and King both supported linkage as a way for developers to pay for the effects of office construction on housing demand and gentrification. They thought linkage would tie neighborhood and downtown interests together. The city, while limited by Proposition 2 1/2 from raising taxes, could use its control over the zoning code and demand linkage payments in exchange for zoning approvals. Community activists pressured White to form an advisory group to study linkage. Months later the Advisory Group report recommended linkage payments of \$5/square foot of office space over 100,000 square feet, payable over twelve years into an affordable housing fund. A nonbinding 1983 referendum showed that Boston residents supported linkage 3 to 1, and White secured BRA approval for linkage before his term ended in December, 1983.³²

White did not run in 1983, weakened by charges of neglect of the neighborhoods and corruption. The pro-linkage sentiment in Boston allowed candidates Ray Flynn and Mel King to portray anti-linkage candidate David Finnegan as tied to downtown interests, and Finnegan finished fourth in the preliminary election.³³ Flynn and King, the two final candidates, both represented neighborhoods over downtown interests and favored liberal

housing and service programs.³⁴ Mel King won 95% of the black vote in the preliminary election and formed a "Rainbow Coalition" of the black, Latino, Asian, and gay communities. King charged Flynn with denying the problem of racism in Boston and focusing only on the economic effects of discrimination.³⁵ White neighborhoods supported Flynn, as did many liberals. Flynn was able to revive much of the Irish anti-downtown-Yankee sentiment by basing his campaign on the promise to share downtown prosperity with the neighborhoods. The campaign saw a "surprising degree of civility and a high level of tolerance,"³⁶ and Flynn defeated King with 66% of the vote.³⁷

1983-1992: BOSTON UNDER FLYNN

Flynn took over a city that, in many ways, had continued its decline of the 1950's. The city's population decline continued until 1980, and median family income fell further and further behind the metropolitan area and national medians. (See tables 1 and 3.) Accompanying these declines, though, were significant sectoral shifts in employment, both in Boston and in the metropolitan area. (See table 4.) The growing service and finance/insurance/real estate sectors created demand for downtown office space.

Boston's neighborhoods in 1980's continued to differ significantly in racial composition and income. Roxbury had the lowest median family income of Boston's neighborhoods, as well as the highest percentage of minority residents. It also lagged consistently behind the Boston average in major socioeconomic indicators. (See tables 5 and 6.)

Roxbury had long suffered from a lack of private investment. Of the 17 million square feet of office construction in Boston between 1968 and 1980,

TABLE 3:
 MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME FOR THE CITY OF BOSTON, COMPARED TO
 METROPOLITAN AND NATIONAL INCOME
 (DOLLAR FIGURES IN CONSTANT 1991 DOLLARS)

	City of Boston	Boston as percentage of metropolitan area	Boston as percentage of national
1949	19,303	92.4	104.6
1959	26,266	85.9	106.1
1969	32,090	79.8	95.3
1979	28,691	70.3	80.6

SOURCES: United States. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Census of Population: 1980. Vol II, Characteristics of the Population. Part 23, Massachusetts. Washington: GPO, 1983.

United States. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Census of Population: 1970. Vol II, Characteristics of the Population. Part 23, Massachusetts. Washington: GPO, 1973.

United States. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Census of Population: 1960. Vol II, Characteristics of the Population. Part 23, Massachusetts. Washington: GPO, 1963.

United States. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Census of Population: 1950. Vol I, Characteristics of the Population. Part 21, Massachusetts. Washington: GPO, 1952.

United States. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990. (110th ed.) Washington: GPO, 1990.

United States. Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1. Washington: GPO, 1975.

TABLE 4:
PRIVATE NONFARM EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR, SUFFOLK COUNTY
(IN PERCENT OF TOTAL PRIVATE NONFARM EMPLOYMENT)

	Manufacturing	Trade	Services	Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
1940	25.4	28.5	22.9	5.8
1950	27.9	28.1	22.0	6.5
1960	29.9	22.8	26.0	7.5
1970	18.0	23.8	28.1	not reported
1979	13.7	19.8	38.4	14.7
1987	8.7	13.1	45.7	17.5

Note: Data are not available for the City of Boston. Suffolk County includes the City of Boston and the towns of Chelsea, Revere, and Winthrop. These towns are small relative to the City of Boston, and Suffolk County is therefore an acceptable proxy for Boston.

SOURCES: United States. Bureau of the Census. State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1991. Washington: GPO, 1991.

United States. Bureau of the Census. State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1979. Washington: GPO, 1979.

United States. Department of Commerce. Office of Business Economics. Growth Patterns in Employment by County 1940-1950 and 1950-1960. By Lowell D. Ashby. Washington: GPO, 1965.

TABLE 5:
BOSTON NEIGHBORHOODS, RANKED BY 1980 MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME
(PLUS POPULATION AND PERCENT MINORITY)

	Median Family Income, 1980 (1991 dollars)	Minorities ⁺ (percentage of 1990 population)	Population (1990)
Back Bay/Beacon Hill	53,337	11.6	27,808
West Roxbury	38,267	5.7	29,706
Hyde Park	32,820	28.0	30,138
Roslindale	30,613	22.6	32,959
Central	29,195	26.1	21,669
Charlestown	27,639	5.4	14,718
Allston/Brighton	27,612	26.9	70,284
North Dorchester	26,311*	47.4	25,068
South Dorchester	26,311*	51.9	60,630
South Boston	24,996	4.5	29,488
South End	23,777	60.6	28,842
Mattapan/Franklin	23,761	92.3	35,982
East Boston	23,594	24.2	32,941
Jamaica Plain	23,044	49.9	40,995
Fenway/Kenmore	21,886	28.8	32,880
ROXBURY	17,579	93.9	58,893
BOSTON	26,210	41.0	574,283

*Income given only for Dorchester as a whole.

⁺Minorities include blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans.

Central includes Chinatown and the North End.

1990 Census income data was not ready at time of printing.

SOURCES: Population and minorities from the Boston Redevelopment Authority publication #408. Income from The Livable City.

TABLE 6:
ROXBURY AND BOSTON COMPARED

	Roxbury	Boston
Population change, 1950-1990, percent	-51.7	-28.3
Percent of persons in poverty, 1984	31	21
Percent of housing in poor condition*, 1984	16	8
Unemployment rate, 1985, percent	14	6
Percent of adults without high school diploma, 1985	38	23

*As defined by the Boston Redevelopment Authority.

SOURCE: Boston Redevelopment Authority. Roxbury Neighborhood Profile. Publication #199.

none was in Roxbury. A 1991 Federal Reserve study offered evidence that banks continued to "redline" black areas in Boston, preventing even wealthy blacks from receiving mortgages. And there was an absence of retail and service establishments in Roxbury. Retail and other development projects in Roxbury often depended on financing from small banks and city agencies, since larger banks were wary of providing loans for development there. Some developers argued that the lack of investment was a "vicious circle," as unused land and buildings resulted in deterioration, which in turn discouraged investment.³⁸

Flynn's promise to help the neighborhoods was made more difficult by further changes in the federal aid structure. During the Reagan years, the Administration and Congress reduced urban aid, especially CDBG's and UDAG's, and reversed Carter's changes in the formula for CDBG's. This, coupled with the early 1980's fiscal crisis and decreased property tax revenue, forced Flynn to look for new ways to fund neighborhood development and services.³⁹ In 1985, Flynn accepted housing activists' demands and raised linkage payments by \$1/square foot, earmarked for job training programs, and shortened the payment period.⁴⁰ Flynn and Governor Dukakis then also publicly announced their plan to develop Parcel 18.

The use of linkage payments contrasted with the national tendency for most cities to attract investment by providing a "good business climate" of low taxes, tax abatements, or other subsidies.⁴¹ White had objected to linkage for fear of driving away potential investment. Flynn carefully expanded linkage in 1985, though, after winning support of the business community. Flynn won business support after new BRA director Stephen Coyle announced that the BRA would continue to support nine of the eleven development projects started during White's administration. And

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 developers realized that linkage payments amounted to less than one percent of office development costs, hardly enough to deter development in Boston's booming office market.⁴² (See table 7.)

Flynn was credited with "broadening the popular consensus for growth." Developers accepted linkage as part of the cost of doing business in Boston. Linkage payments also placated the neighborhoods: since 1984, there has been "no significant organized opposition" to new development, downtown or elsewhere.⁴³ Coyle, too, was praised for making the BRA approval process for development more uniform and for involving neighborhood groups more closely in development planning.⁴⁴ Also, the Flynn administration built thousands of low-income housing units.⁴⁵

Flynn's continuing popularity separated him from past mayors, including White, but Flynn had critics, particularly from some of Boston's black leaders. Mel King continued to charge Flynn with ignoring the racial component of economic inequality in Boston. Others have criticized Flynn for taking credit for linkage and the Boston Resident Jobs Policy, according to which developers are required to give 50% of construction jobs to Boston residents, 25% to minorities, and 10% to women, since Flynn became mayor after those policies were formulated. And, some doubt the economic benefits of linkage payments and housing programs, claiming that Roxbury and other neighborhoods did not become much better off than years ago. The criticism of linkage has good foundation: the \$5 per square foot payment has raised only 4-6% of the funds necessary for the city to produce enough housing to absorb all of the additional housing demand that downtown office construction has created.⁴⁶

Impatience and dissatisfaction in the black community prompted four black leaders to develop a proposal for the minority neighborhoods of Boston

TABLE 7:
THE BOSTON OFFICE MARKET: CONSTRUCTION, CHANGE IN TOTAL VALUE,
AVERAGE RENT, AND VACANCY RATES, 1979-1991

	Office Construction 1000's square feet	Change in total real assessed value, from previous year, in percent	Average asking gross rent, downtown, dollars per square foot, per year* (1991 dollars)	Vacancy rates, downtown, in percent
1979	897	(a)	22.47	(b)
1980	464	(a)	29.37	1.2
1981	2614	(a)	36.02	3.9
1982	2062	(a)	38.02	6.1
1983	747	(a)	38.82	2.6
1984	5839	6.9	37.02	10.4
1985	1637	21.5	37.41	9.8
1986	4172	36.3	37.86	5.7
1987	3726	14.8	41.58	5.2
1988	4362	10.6	41.96	12.0
1989	887	8.1	36.98	11.5
1990	1007	-3.2	33.52	14.6
1991	910	-1.7	26.27	16.5

* These rent data are purely illustrative, to show the changing Boston office market. Asking rents are between 10 and 30 percent above effective rents, so these data should not be compared to rent figures given in the text. Also, these data are gross rents, and so include taxes, linkage fees, and etc. Gross rent is typically \$7-10 above net rent. All rent references in the text are given as net rent.

(a) Since 1983, city assessment of property was required to reflect 100% valuation of property, as stipulated by Proposition 2 1/2. Before 1983, assessments were not a reliable measure of property values.

(b) Not reported.

SOURCES: Construction data from Boston Redevelopment Authority, publications #83, #226, and #409. Assessment data from City Assessing Office, unpublished. Rent data from Boston Redevelopment Authority publication #282, and from Meredith and Grew brokerage firm in Boston (those two sources are consistent), deflated by GDP deflator. Vacancy rates from Boston Redevelopment Authority publication #429. See full citations in the Works Cited.

to secede and form the "City of Mandela." Mandela would have incorporated 25% of Boston's land area and 90% of the minority population, offering minorities greater political independence than they enjoyed as part of Boston. The Mandela proposal became a 1986 ballot question, but it failed by a 3-1 margin. Secession was more a strategy of desperation than of practicality. Many black leaders opposed the proposal, arguing that Boston's black areas were economically tied to downtown and could not constitute a feasible independent economy.⁴⁷

In spite of the Mandela proposal, in the 1987 election Flynn performed better in black neighborhoods than in his home neighborhood, South Boston. Before the election, Flynn announced plans to integrate public housing in Charlestown, East Boston, and South Boston. As in the 1974 busing conflict, those neighborhoods considered Flynn's integration plan to be a betrayal of their communities.⁴⁸

Racial tension rose again in the early 1990's. The firing of Laval Wilson, the first black superintendent of Boston's schools, and the Stuart case, where the police assumed (incorrectly) that a black man was responsible for the murder of Carol Stuart, increased black distrust of city government.⁴⁹ Flynn was criticized for not apologizing adequately for the police response to the Stuart murder. Also, gang violence increased crime rates in Roxbury, Mattapan, and North Dorchester. Stalled development projects, including Parcel 18, led black leaders to question Flynn's commitment to the black community.⁵⁰ Some black leaders have renewed the push for secession and incorporation of a separate city covering the greater Roxbury and Mattapan area, and they hope to introduce again a secession referendum in 1994. Again, many black leaders, including those who have supported Flynn's linkage policy, oppose secession.⁵¹

Boston saw the long office market boom end in the late 1980's. Throughout the 1980's, office building construction continued at unprecedented levels, encouraged by low vacancy rates. However, the demand for office space fell sharply in 1988, without a corresponding drop in construction. The office vacancy rate rose from 5.2% at the end of 1987 to 16.5% in 1991. The BRA estimates that a vacancy rate of 12.5% or higher is "generally too high to attract investment." Boston's vacancy rate rose above this level in 1990, and the BRA projects that the vacancy rate will stay above 12.5% until at least 1994.⁵² Office construction and renovation have slowed from nearly three million square feet per year in the mid-1980's to well under one million square feet per year projected for 1991 to 1994.⁵³ The total assessed value of commercial real estate in Boston rose over 10% per year from 1983 to 1989, and fell in 1990 and 1991. (See table 7.) The BRA projects that the downtown office market will remain depressed for most of the 1990's.

Parcel-to-parcel linkage arose from the specific political and economic context that characterized mid-1980's Boston. The above history points to four factors that set the stage for the development of Parcel 18. First is the traditional downtown-neighborhood rivalry. Every Boston mayor has had to balance the often-conflicting interests of downtown and the neighborhoods, and several have been able to transcend this rivalry. Parcel-to-parcel linkage was a concrete unification of downtown and neighborhood interests, and I will show how the symbolic importance of this union inspired Roxbury and government leaders to push for Parcel 18's development.

Second, Boston's black community grew rapidly in the mid-century and mobilized politically beginning in the 1970's. As I will explain, the black

community felt that the city and state government owed Roxbury the development of Parcel 18 to make up for past neglect and injustice. The growing political power of blacks in Boston made this demand difficult for Mayor Flynn and Governor Dukakis to ignore.

Third, the promulgation of a linkage payments policy in 1983 marked a new era of progressive development policy in Boston. In contrast to the Hynes, Collins, and later White administrations, the Flynn administration sought to spread the benefits of downtown development instead of spreading its costs with tax exemptions and land clearance. As the political coalition theorist Clarence Stone might say, the Flynn administration marked a shift from a "corporate coalition" to a "progressive coalition," setting the stage for progressive policies like the development of Parcel 18.

Finally, the 1980's downtown office market boom and bust shaped the history of Parcel 18 more than any other factor did. Parcel-to-parcel linkage tied the fate of Parcel 18 to downtown development, and when downtown conditions changed, the context for Parcel 18 also changed. Much of my analysis in the following chapters consists of weighing the relative importance of these contextual forces in shaping the history of Parcel 18.

CHAPTER THREE: FROM HIGHWAY PLANS TO DEVELOPMENT PLANS

Parcel 18 was born under protest. It was cleared as part of a plan to build a highway linking downtown to Boston's western suburbs. But opposition to the highway plan brought together activists from Roxbury and Jamaica Plain, who were opposed to the disruption that such construction would cause, and urban planners, who opposed highways on principled grounds and favored mass transit. After the success of the highway protests, a Roxbury community group took the lead in pushing for the development of Parcel 18 and won the support and participation of the city and state governments. By 1988 the project had found a developer, a supportive political consensus, and high expectations.

THE SOUTHWEST CORRIDOR

In 1948 Massachusetts released a comprehensive highway scheme detailing the construction of radial and circumferential roads linking downtown Boston to city neighborhoods and the suburbs. Most of the highways that currently serve the Boston area were first planned in the 1948 document, including the Central Artery (I-93), Route 128, Storrow Drive, the Massachusetts Turnpike (I-90) extension, the stretch of I-93 north of Boston, and the Concord Turnpike (Route 2). The 1948 plan also proposed the construction of an Inner Belt near downtown Boston and a Southwest Expressway, which would connect the proposed Inner Belt to a proposed outer beltway, Route 128. The Southwest Expressway was to follow an existing railroad track bed, and included in the plan was the creation of a new subway line in the highway's median.¹ (See Map 5.)

To make way for the Southwest Expressway, the Massachusetts Department of Public Works cleared over 100 acres of land along the 4.7-mile

corridor from the South Cove in downtown Boston to Jamaica Plain, cutting through Chinatown, Back Bay, the South End, and Roxbury. This clearing began in 1966 and took three years, destroying 700 housing units and 300 businesses in the process.²

The late 1960's and early 1970's marked an era of resistance to highway construction in America in response to two decades of rapid highway creation under the Interstate Highway System. The 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act and later amendments had provided for the construction of 42,500 miles of interstate highways, of which 8,600 would be built in urban areas. When Congress passed that act, only 480 miles of urban freeways were in operation or under construction. Highway building sparked almost immediate opposition around the country, and throughout the 1960's numerous highway protests blocked the construction of new roads, especially urban roads. Protesters objected to the routing of many highways through low-income urban areas, and they were also concerned about environmental and aesthetic effects.³

In Boston, community resistance to highway building had grown with the construction of each successive highway, particularly with regard to the Central Artery, Storrow Drive, and the Mass Pike extension. These movements were part of a larger trend of community protests over urban renewal, such as the CAUSE protests discussed in the last chapter. Public opposition "passed the threshold of critical strength" by the time the land for the Southwest Expressway had been cleared.⁴ The land clearance "furthered mistrust of and antagonism to government in the city's African-American community." Roxbury protesters were joined by many city officials, including current U.S. Representative Barney Frank, and state legislators, including former Governor Michael Dukakis.⁵ A coalition of citizens' groups formed,

assisted by a group of advocacy planners called Urban Planning Aid, to contest the construction of the Southwest Expressway as well as the expansion of Logan Airport and other projects.⁶ To answer the strong community opposition that the land-clearing caused, in 1970 Governor Francis Sargent declared a moratorium on all new highway construction within Route 128 until the effects of that construction could be better determined. He created the Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) to study the area's transportation needs. After the BTPR submitted its report in October 1972, and after numerous public hearings, Sargent cancelled the construction of the Southwest Expressway.⁷

In July 1973, Governor Sargent appointed a Southwest Corridor Development Coordinator to pull together community representatives to plan the development of the cleared land. The Commonwealth planned to continue with the construction of the transit line that would have occupied the median of the Southwest Expressway, and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) organized community representatives into smaller groups called Station Area Task Forces, corresponding to the nine eventual stations that the new transit line would include. In 1975, Governor Michael Dukakis, Mayor Kevin White, community groups, and community development corporations signed a Memorandum of Agreement establishing the Station Area Task Forces as the community's official representatives in the Southwest Corridor planning process. Out of the Station Area Task Force for the Ruggles area grew the Parcel 18 Task Force, the community group responsible for helping plan the development of a 5.1-acre section of the Corridor next to the planned Ruggles station. The Task Force has remained the voice of the Roxbury community in negotiations over how to develop Parcel 18 best.⁸

The plan for the Southwest Corridor included building a park; encouraging commercial, residential, and industrial development; and relocating the Orange Line of the subway to the Corridor, replacing the elevated track above Washington Street. In 1975 the federal government transferred the Southwest Expressway highway funds to the transit project, marking the first time in the United States that earmarked highway funds were redesignated for mass transit.⁹ Under the 1973 Federal-Aid Highway Act, the Secretary of Transportation was permitted to approve formerly-designated highway money for "the construction, reconstruction, and improvement of fixed rail facilities," starting in July 1975.¹⁰ Previously, states lost designated highway funds for projects that were cancelled because of public protest.¹¹ After environmental review, construction of the new Orange Line began in January 1978. The Orange Line opened in May 1987.

OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPMENT

In its October 1972 report, the BTPR had explained that if the Southwest Expressway were scrapped and "a new transit service is provided in the corridor along with other public improvements, the potential exists for private redevelopment of the remaining land." The report indicated that the likelihood of redevelopment was greatest if development involved significant government participation.¹² Accordingly, the MBTA and the Southwest Corridor Development Coordinator's office planned great things for Parcel 18.

As early as the summer of 1974, the Commonwealth envisioned a mixed-use center on Parcel 18, containing retail, office, institutional, and hotel space. By 1974, the MBTA planned Ruggles station to replace Dudley station (along the then-existing Washington Street line) as the primary

transfer station for Roxbury.¹³ The 1974 planning document praised Parcel 18 for its accessibility, located at the planned Ruggles station of the new Orange Line and the intersection of the planned New Columbus Avenue and Melnea Cass Boulevard.¹⁴ In the next planning document, dated 1979, the Commonwealth touted Parcel 18 as the premier development space along the Corridor. Plans called for 500,000 to 700,000 square feet of office, institutional, and retail space, plus "the first opportunity in years for a new hotel and entertainment center in Roxbury."¹⁵ A 1982 MBTA report echoed the earlier plans, claiming that Parcel 18 "has probably the greatest development potential in the Corridor."¹⁶

But throughout the 1970's and early 1980's, neither the city nor the state developed more specific plans for developing Parcel 18, and its development faced many serious obstacles. By the early 1980's, the land had been vacant for fifteen years. Local public officials and the business community were far less interested in the development of Parcel 18 during those years than the Task Force was.

Participants in the planning process gave three reasons for the lack of interest the development. First and most important was a fear of crime. According to Sargent's Secretary of Transportation Alan Altshuler, the area was "perceived as dangerous" -- so dangerous that Parcel 18 was "not a location people choose other than for social reasons." Said Altshuler, "it was obvious to me twenty years ago [in the early 1970's] that merely having land does not guarantee private development."¹⁷ A BRA official agreed, adding that the lack of commercial development in Roxbury fueled the perception that Roxbury was a bad investment.¹⁸ Ricardo Millett, who headed the Roxbury Multi-Service Center and later worked at the BRA, claimed that fear

of crime explained the reluctance of public officials, not only private investors, to invest in the area.¹⁹

The second reason for the neglect of the land was the tumultuous history of the parcel, said Millett. The highway protest caused private investors to associate the Southwest Corridor with political agitation and conflict, and there was a need to clear the air of the past controversy. The cancellation of the highway resulted in an administrative obstacle, too: Parcel 18 was jointly owned by the MBTA and the City of Boston because the land originally included state-owned land and city-owned streets, and the cost of coordination and assembly of the parcel by the different owners seemed prohibitively high.²⁰

The third reason was interagency conflict and indifference among the city and state governments. According to Alden Raine, who was Governor Dukakis's chief economic adviser in his second and third terms (1982-1990), Governor Edward King (1978-1982) "didn't care" about the development of the Corridor.²¹ Also, Roxbury's interests were poorly represented in the King and Mayor White administrations. There was a lack of coordination between the MBTA and the BRA at the time, and a "notorious enmity" among the city agencies that claimed to have control of the land. Said Millett, the political infighting was a matter of "petty jealousy," not ideological opposition to development in Roxbury, but it deterred development nonetheless.²²

In 1983 the state and city governments began to focus on the development of Parcel 18. Raine described that year as a natural time for planning its development. The private sector could not be convinced to invest anything in Parcel 18, he said, until the Orange Line was nearly complete. The immediate push to begin serious planning for Parcel 18 came from the Parcel 18 Task Force. Dukakis recalled that minority leaders

approached him and Mayor Flynn shortly after Flynn's election in 1983, and their meetings sparked great interest in the project from both the city and the state.²³ The development of Parcel 18 was on the "short list of five things the Governor wanted to do," dating back to when both Dukakis and Fred Salvucci, Dukakis's Secretary of Transportation, participated in the 1960's highway protests. In 1984 Flynn appointed Stephen Coyle to direct the BRA, and, along with the development of the Waterfront, Lower Roxbury was Coyle's highest development priority. Coyle, Salvucci, and Raine had an "evangelical" desire to complete the project, Raine recalled, and this convergence of community initiative, government interests, and skilled urban planners brought hope to the project.²⁴

One option for the development of Parcel 18 was to divide up the land and sell off small pieces to private developers, said Millett. Small private investors expressed interest, but community and government leaders envisioned a grander project than gas stations and small retail.²⁵ Numerous constraints made more conventional development strategies impossible, however. First of all, the negative public perception of Roxbury made the land worthless. Very large public subsidies would be necessary to encourage a private investor to develop the land.²⁶ Second, the state and/or city needed to employ a marketing strategy for Parcel 18 to demonstrate government support of development and to counteract the "injustice of past urban renewal" that alienated the community and investors.²⁷ Third, the development plan needed to spread the burden of public subsidies fairly between the city and state in order to overcome the past rivalries over the land. Fourth, the subsidy for development had to come from a new, creative source, since the federal UDAG program had been scaled down significantly,

and raising taxes to finance the project would have been politically impossible because Proposition 2 1/2 kept property taxes low.²⁸

THE THEORY OF PARCEL-TO-PARCEL LINKAGE

With these constraints in mind, BRA Director Coyle formulated a plan for the development of Parcel 18: parcel-to-parcel linkage. Coyle also proposed minority equity in the project and significant community benefits for Roxbury. According to Millett, parcel-to-parcel linkage was the "unique conceptualization of Stephen Coyle," who won support for his plan from Dukakis, Flynn, and, most impressively, a minority community that did not trust the BRA.²⁹

Parcel-to-parcel linkage means that two publicly-owned pieces of land are offered simultaneously for development. One piece of land is in a downtown or similarly desirable location, and the other is in an area that would otherwise stimulate little demand for development. The public agency that owns the land offers the package at a price that promises the developer a reasonable return on the total development. Parcel-to-parcel linkage attempts to guarantee the development of the less lucrative land that might not be able to command rents in excess of the costs of its development. Alternatively, if the second parcel is somewhat profitable, the developer might be required to hold down rents on the second parcel, enabling neighborhood offices and stores to rent space. In effect, the expected profits from the more lucrative land subsidize the less-profitable development on the other land. Parcel-to-parcel linkage utilizes the government's control over land use policy and the high demand for publicly-owned downtown space. By harnessing this demand, the subsidy for the second parcel is entirely

internal to private sector development: the local government need not depend on tax revenue or on federal aid.

This linkage strategy depends on an expectation that public investment will spur significant private investment, an expectation that was the basis of many pro-growth public-private development partnerships in the 1980's. Such partnerships were a movement away from both regulation and direct grants and offered cities a chance to plan the design, structure, or benefits of private development projects.³⁰

One progressive element of parcel-to-parcel linkage is that the policy spreads the developer's profit from the downtown project to other, poorer neighborhoods. By funding the development of Parcel 18 partly from downtown profits, parcel-to-parcel linkage uses one of the city's valuable assets (the downtown land) not only for private benefit but for explicitly public benefit as well. This contrasts with traditional development policy, both in Boston and nationally. Recall Boston's use of Chapter 121A tax exemptions to encourage office development -- these tax abatements reduced the public revenue benefits of development, whereas parcel-to-parcel linkage expands the public benefits of downtown development.

The project had overtly political goals, too. According to Reverend Tony Bethel, Chairperson of the Parcel 18 Task Force since 1987, the Roxbury community saw the development of Parcel 18 as direct compensation for the destruction involved in clearing the Southwest Corridor. As he put it, the community said to the city and state governments, in effect, "you took from us ... now you're going to make us whole. ... You can't give us back the community that this took out, but you can give us housing and business opportunities."³¹ The community saw Roxbury's predicament more as the result of the government's decision to clear land for the expressway than as

Roxbury?

the result of market forces. Even after Sargent had scrapped the plans for the expressway, the community still felt neglected. In contrast to the coalition of citizens' groups under Urban Planning Aid to protest the construction of the Southwest Expressway, "it was left to Roxbury to decide what to do" with the vacant land after Sargent scrapped the highway plan.³² The Roxbury community saw the development of Parcel 18 as compensation for past government neglect.

As the voice of the Roxbury community, the Parcel 18 Task Force had specific concerns about the development of the land. They wanted assurances that the state and city governments would offer enough participation to make the project financially feasible. They were concerned about the effects on traffic and the possibility of rising land values in the area leading to gentrification.³³ More immediately, though, the Task Force was "pushing hard" for minority equity in the development. According to Beverley Johnson, BRA Deputy Director for Community Economic Development and BRA liaison to Roxbury for Parcel 18, there was "never a question whether [minority equity] would happen."³⁴

In July 1985, Governor Dukakis and Mayor Flynn signed an agreement to cooperate in the development of Parcel 18. They agreed to allow the BRA to act as the development agent for Parcel 18, of which 71% was owned by the MBTA and the rest by the City; to work with the Parcel 18 Task Force as the "legitimate public participatory body"; to strive for economic benefits for community development corporations and minority businesses; to "link the development rights for Parcel 18 to the development rights for a major downtown parcel, to maximize the economic attractiveness of Parcel 18"; and to "commit public sector tenancy to the Parcel 18 development both to ensure the economic viability of the project and to bring vital public services closer to

the residents of the neighborhoods." The agreement included a promise of minority equity participation.³⁵

The Commonwealth and the City downplayed the compensatory aspect of the project, which Reverend Bethel emphasized, and instead concentrated on economic rationales. According to the agreement, the Commonwealth saw the development of Parcel 18 as "the culmination of a decade-long public investment in the Southwest Corridor" starting with the Orange Line construction. In addition, the joint development of Parcel 18 seemed to represent a shift in economic responsibility for Roxbury from the Commonwealth to the City, signifying the end of over \$800 million in direct state investment for the construction of the Orange Line (much of which was federal money). For the City, the development "mark[ed] the beginning of a comprehensive revitalization program for the square mile surrounding Dudley Station," the historical and commercial center of Roxbury.³⁶

According to one BRA official, after his election in 1983 Mayor Flynn wanted to become known as the mayor who revitalized Boston's neighborhoods and counteracted many of the destructive effects of urban renewal.³⁷ Flynn's agreement with Dukakis proclaimed that the development of Parcel 18 would:

bring the benefits of Boston's and Massachusetts' expanding commercial economy into the heart of a disadvantaged inner city residential community. Parcel 18+ represents a unique opportunity to change conditions we find unacceptable -- profound poverty and disinvestment in the shadow of expanding economic prosperity.³⁸

Flynn and Dukakis were responding to the growing economic gap between downtown and Roxbury during the mid-1980's boom, suggesting that their involvement might counteract the effects of market forces that threatened to

widen the difference between a wealthy downtown and a poorer neighborhood.

THE BRA'S VISION

For the most part, the BRA put together the specific parcel-to-parcel linkage plans on its own.³⁹ On the same day that the Governor and the Mayor signed their agreement, the BRA released a development prospectus for Parcel 18, the first piece of land to be developed under the new linkage program. Parcel 18, they said, was blessed with "unique locational characteristics" -- next to a subway and commuter rail station, and next to Cass Boulevard, which leads to the Southeast Expressway. (See Map 6.) The prospectus also stressed the significant level of public support for its development. The BRA linked this parcel to a downtown parcel, comprised of the municipally-owned Kingston-Bedford parking garage and the 140 Essex Street surface parking lot in Chinatown. The BRA praised the downtown location as "ideally suited to capitalize upon the projected demand for an additional 13.0 million square feet of new office space in the coming decade."⁴⁰

The BRA offered its vision of parcel-to-parcel linkage in the prospectus:

In view of the very strong pressures for new office and retail space in the downtown area, there is intense competition for the remaining publicly owned development parcels. As a condition of having the right to acquire and improve these downtown parcels, developers will be required to commit to the development of important parcels in Boston neighborhoods. As the economics of these parcels may require, the City is prepared to devote a portion of its participation in its downtown parcels to assist in assuring overall project financial feasibility.⁴¹

The BRA also specified that a minority partnership must hold at least 25% of the equity, and that 30% of participating businesses (e.g., construction contractors) must be minority-owned.⁴²

The Boston Globe praised the BRA for its insistence on minority participation and its desire to develop land in economically-disadvantaged neighborhoods. It is "the mark of a mature city," said an editorial, that for the "first time in a half-century, no mayor of Boston will rattle a tin cup and beg [developers] to stay."⁴³ What the Globe called "maturity," though, was made possible only by the high demand for space in downtown Boston, a factor over which the BRA had little control. Stephen Coyle, the director of the BRA, acknowledged the project's dependence on outside forces in calling it "'the riskiest development undertaking in the city's history.'"⁴⁴

In March 1986, the BRA released a report detailing the financial terms and justifications for the project. The mixed-use center at Parcel 18 would consist of two 25-story office buildings, with a total of a million square feet of office space; one to two hundred thousand square feet of retail space; three to five hundred housing units; and a one-thousand-car parking garage.⁴⁵ The BRA hoped the office space at Parcel 18 would compete with suburban office space to prevent smaller firms and back-office operations from leaving the city because downtown was too expensive. Keeping office rents low enough to compete with suburban space required public investment in the project, the report argued.⁴⁶ Keeping jobs in Boston, said Raine, demonstrated that the project would benefit Boston in the aggregate, rather than simply transferring income from one area of Boston to another.⁴⁷

The BRA designed the project to provide money both for public housing and for a community development fund. While the details were to be later negotiated with the developer and the community, the BRA expected

the combined downtown-Roxbury project to generate \$7 million in housing linkage funds and \$1.4 million in job training linkage funds, as required by the 1983 linkage payments policy. The developer would also contribute a fraction of project income to community development funds for Chinatown and Roxbury, which would in turn be used to support more housing creation, venture capital, and community-development corporations.⁴⁸ The largest benefit that the BRA projected was the increase in employment in Roxbury. Parcel 18 would support four thousand permanent jobs -- nearly a 50% increase over the nine thousand jobs located in Roxbury in 1986 -- and later negotiations with the developer and community guaranteed that many of these jobs would be for minorities and city residents. Thus the project had both pro-growth and redistributive aspects, a result that the theorists Harvey, Friedman, and Peterson would argue is rare if not impossible.⁴⁹

The BRA estimated that the combined project would require a \$410 million investment, of which \$114 million would be public funds. This public subsidy had the following components: The city-owned Chinatown land would be sold for \$18.5 million, or approximately \$300/square foot of land. These proceeds, plus the \$8.4 million in linkage funds, would help finance the project and be part of the city's contribution. The city also donated staff time at the BRA, which would serve as the city and state's agent for development. The state would contribute \$25 million in housing creation funds for the project, plus the bulk of the land value of Parcel 18.⁵⁰

The BRA planned to sell the Roxbury land for a nominal fee, and it considered the estimated market value of \$7 million -- approximately \$32/square foot of land -- to be, in effect, another public subsidy. Since the MBTA owned most of the land, this contribution would come primarily from the state. The BRA also expected a \$10 million federal UDAG and

approximately \$40 million in foundation and site preparation work from a then-undetermined source. These subsidies lowered the developer's investment to \$296 million. The BRA expected that office space would rent for \$40-45/square foot downtown and \$22-28/square foot in Roxbury. The developer would yield a return on net development costs of 13% on the downtown project and 8% on Parcel 18, for a combined return of 11.5%. The cash-on-cash return would be 14.8% on downtown, 5.4% on Parcel 18, and 11.1% on the combined investment.⁵¹ (See appendix for definitions.)

The other public involvement that the Dukakis-Flynn agreement and the BRA report proposed was a state agency as a tenant for Parcel 18. The developer would not be able to secure private financing for the project without an anchor tenant, and the BRA expected that a private tenant might be hard to find without concrete proof of government support for the project. After a state agency committed to tenancy, the BRA expected that firms needing back-office space, nearby hospitals, and neighboring Northeastern University would all rent space in the project.⁵² Also, Flynn and Dukakis agreed to commit a state agency, rather than a city agency, as part of their more general compromise to share the burden of public contributions.⁵³ The BRA expected that the developer and an anchor tenant would be quickly chosen and anticipated that the project would begin in 18 months, in October 1987.⁵⁴

Neither that starting date nor the estimated private and public contribution proved accurate. The plans for Parcel 18 have been repeatedly delayed and revised. The starting date is now set for the spring of 1992, and, as the project is currently designed, the composition of the public sector contribution has changed considerably. Also, the project will be smaller than first envisioned, and later stages will include a hotel rather than housing

units. The history of these plans was affected by changing market conditions and political controversy.

SELECTING A DEVELOPER

Once the original plans were proposed, the next major task for the BRA was to select a developer. In late September 1986, as the developer selection process was about to start, Mayor Flynn asked the BRA to raise the required minority equity share from 25% to 30% of the project. The Globe reported that the administration saw the increase as "an effective tool for Flynn to use against the Roxbury secession movement" and against the agitation for the formation of the City of Mandela, which was then at its height.⁵⁵ The BRA approved the change the next day. To prevent a legal challenge to the minority equity requirement, the BRA had to prove a historical lack of minority participation in and benefit from development and show that the plan had a "valid remedial aim and be designed to eliminate the effects of past discrimination." Coyle cited statistics to the BRA Board stating that blacks were 23% of Boston's population but owned less than one percent of Boston's businesses; that black-owned businesses were one-fourth the size of the city average; and that blacks had a higher unemployment rate and lower household income than whites.⁵⁶

To assure 30% minority equity, the BRA would select a minority developer first, who would then have nine months to pick another developer with whom the development partnership would be formed. Even though the second developer was expected to hold more equity in the project, the BRA decided that the minority developer would retain management control. While Flynn and the BRA were making these final changes in preparation for the selection process, a minority partnership announced its

intent to compete for the project. The Chinese Investment Group and Ruggles/Bedford Associates, a black and Hispanic development group, joined to form Columbia Plaza Associates (CPA) in September 1986. This partnership represented both Roxbury and Chinatown, the two areas where the linked parcels were located.⁵⁷

By January 1987, five minority developers had submitted proposals to the BRA. Of these, two were out-of-town partnerships, and the BRA announced in March that it would select a developer from the three local competitors: CPA, Boston Development Collaborative, and Interlink. These three developers presented proposals to the BRA and to community groups throughout the spring of 1987. As part of their proposals, the developers were required to outline specific community benefit packages for Roxbury and Chinatown. Each developer presented a package of trust funds, housing, day care, job training, and other benefits to win the support of the Parcel 18 Task Force and the analogous community group in Chinatown, the Chinatown/South Cove Neighborhood Council.⁵⁸

Flynn, Parcel 18 Task Force Chair Marvin Gilmore, and Bolling urged the three developers to merge and form a 100% minority partnership to guarantee maximum benefits for minorities in Boston and to forego the second part of the developer selection process.⁵⁹ A member of development team that was eventually selected said later that merging the three minority developers would have been infeasible on two accounts: first, none of the three minority partnerships had experience with developments as large as Parcel 18, and second, the three partnerships could not raise the necessary equity.⁶⁰ One BRA official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that the selection of the developer was a bitter process that resulted in a rivalry between developers that manifested itself in subsequent political

controversies. This rivalry became public when the Boston Development Collaborative charged the BRA with "preselection" of CPA and accused the Parcel 18 Task Force, who recommended CPA, of having members with conflicts of interest.⁶¹

In mid-June 1987, Coyle recommended the selection of CPA due to their strong neighborhood ties, real estate development experience, strong financial backing, and Task Force support.⁶² A week later, the BRA Board chose CPA. Because the Parcel 18 land was owned primarily by the MBTA, and because the downtown land was controlled by the Boston Public Facilities Department, both agencies had to give CPA their approval. Those agencies gave their approval within a month of the BRA's approval.

By October 1987, six developers, including two Boston groups, approached CPA with the intent to share in the project. CPA narrowed the list to three serious contenders: Metropolitan Structures of Chicago, Trammell Crow of Dallas, and JMB/Urban of Chicago (the developer of Copley Place). All three developers offered CPA more than the required 30% equity, and all three agreed to a "long list" of community benefits.⁶³

According to Reverend Bethel, the BRA, the Commonwealth, the City, and the community representatives had already settled on a community benefits package, and the second developer had to agree to these benefits prior to their selection.⁶⁴ In late February, CPA selected Metropolitan Structures as a 50% equity partner, and two weeks later the BRA approved the new partnership, Metropolitan/Columbia Plaza Venture (MCPV), as the developer of Parcel 18 and the downtown land. MCPV hoped to begin construction at the start of 1989.

The Globe hailed the selection of the developer partnership as a "milestone," praising Dukakis, Flynn, Coyle, the Roxbury and Chinatown

community groups, and the CPA for helping the project get so far. The editorial warned, though, that "they must remain united to speed the project to completion."⁶⁵ As it turns out, forces other than disunity among the primary actors threatened the project. Before beginning construction, the developer needed to land an anchor tenant to guarantee financing. Private financing had become a more pressing need by 1988 than in 1985 because of the lack of state and federal funds for development, according to Coyle.⁶⁶

Finding a lead tenant for Parcel 18 was not easy -- recall Altshuler's warning that Parcel 18 was "not a location people choose other than for social reasons."⁶⁷ Although the developer searched for a private anchor tenant, when asked if there had been any serious private sector possibilities, a member of the development team said, "I wouldn't say serious."⁶⁸ The reluctance of private investors and tenants to take interest in Parcel 18 put pressure on the BRA to find a public agency to become the anchor tenant. The search for a public tenant sparked the sudden politicization of the development of Parcel 18 and damaged the comparatively quiet and consensual planning process that the project had hitherto enjoyed.

CHAPTER FOUR: PUBLIC POLITICIZATION

Ask a Bostonian about Parcel 18 and he or she is likely to recall the battle over the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA), a semi-autonomous state agency that the city, state, and developer hoped would become the anchor tenant of the project. Before that controversy erupted, there was a relatively small group of Bostonians who had a significant stake in the development of Parcel 18: Roxbury residents, Chinatown residents, the BRA, and the state and city leaderships. The MWRA conflict expanded this group of stakeholders and altered the focus of the development. Parcel 18 became a battleground for interests and political rivalries that had little to do with the justifications for the development.

THE MWRA NEEDS A NEW HOME

Governor Dukakis's chief economic adviser, Alden Raine, recalled talking to Paul Levy, director of the MWRA, in June 1988. Levy told Raine that the lease for the MWRA's headquarters in the Charlestown Navy Yard would expire in 1991, and he asked Raine if he knew of potential headquarters locations that were near downtown and accessible to public transit. Raine told Levy to consider Parcel 18. Said Raine, the MWRA "fell into our lap" as an option for anchor tenant.¹ MCPV planned to "make an effort" to get the MWRA as the lead tenant.²

The MWRA sent out a Request for Proposal in August 1988 to investigate the options available for moving its headquarters. The primary motivation for this search was the expected increase in cost at the Charlestown Navy Yard. Phil Shapiro, Chief Financial Officer at the MWRA, said that the MWRA wanted to "create some competition" with its current landlords to force the landlords to offer the MWRA a cheaper lease in June

1991.³ Seventeen sites responded to the Request for Proposal. By February 1989 the MWRA staff narrowed down the list to seven, which included the Charlestown Navy Yard; Parcel 18; 226 Causeway Street and Fort Point Place, both in Boston; Malden Corporate Center and the Metro Business Center, both in Malden; and the Fore River Staging Area in Quincy.⁴

The seven sites were selected according to the criteria that the MWRA listed in its Request for Proposal. First among these was that the space be ready for occupancy by June 1991. The MWRA required 200,000 to 250,000 square feet of space, twice that of the headquarters' space in Charlestown, plus adequate parking spaces and day care facilities. Next was that the MWRA wanted a "location that promotes safety/security, near available basic services," within twenty minutes from the Central Business District, and served by public transportation. Also, the MWRA asked for extensive cost estimates, including renovations and tenant improvements.⁵

Before March 1989, the selection process attracted little attention. The only political involvement at this point came from Flynn and the BRA, who urged the MWRA to select Parcel 18 as its new headquarters. In a letter to Levy, Flynn praised Parcel 18 for its locational and operational advantages for the MWRA. He also wrote that locating in Roxbury would be an economic stimulus to an economically disadvantaged area within the MWRA's jurisdiction. In late February Flynn followed his letter up with a meeting among minority leaders in Roxbury, at which they discussed an "intensive lobbying campaign" to influence the MWRA in favor of Parcel 18.⁶

Throughout the spring, the MWRA made little comment as it proceeded with its own evaluation of the seven sites, expecting to make a final decision in May 1989. The public debate grew much louder, though. In a March 8 letter to the MWRA's Board of Directors, Governor Dukakis joined

Flynn in support of Parcel 18. He referred to Parcel 18 as the "centerpiece of our revitalization strategy for the Southwest Corridor" and told the MWRA that the "people of these neighborhoods are counting on our success." He also appealed to the self-interest of the MWRA, praising the location of the land for its proximity to universities that would train employees and for its proximity to roads and public transportation. Finally, he pledged his help in facilitating the transfer of land from the MBTA and the BRA to the developer in order to start the project on time.⁷

The Advisory Board of the MWRA then sent a letter back to Dukakis, asking him to keep the ratepayers' interest in mind by keeping costs low and suggesting that the state make the Parcel 18 bid more competitive by offering greater assistance.⁸ However, some developers and politicians claimed that Flynn and Dukakis overstated the importance of the MWRA to Parcel 18. The Globe ran an article titled "Economic Value of MWRA Offices Questioned," reporting that local real estate brokers doubted that MWRA-related consultants and engineers would follow the MWRA's move to Roxbury. And the MWRA's landlords at the Charlestown Navy Yard alleged that the plans for Parcel 18 included building a cafeteria within the MWRA, which would dramatically reduce the retail boom that might otherwise occur around Parcel 18 to serve the new employees. Even Robert Green, MCPV's President, said, "'As far as whether it's make or break for the project, I think that has been way overstated in the press.'"⁹

Jeanne Pinado, another member of MCPV, defended Flynn and Dukakis. When others said that Parcel 18 did not need the MWRA in particular and could wait for something else, she answered that "there aren't a lot of something elses." Only occasionally do state agencies' leases expire. Furthermore, the MWRA had the additional advantage of being a growing

agency that would continue hiring people, and its location at Parcel 18 would provide more local jobs than an agency that was not hiring.¹⁰ Dukakis added that with other agencies, "you don't get the concentration of technology and engineering" that the MWRA would bring to Roxbury. He envisioned MWRA jobs as a great "field opportunity" for Roxbury students at nearby Northeastern University, Roxbury Community College, and Wentworth Institute.¹¹

Proponents of another site, the Fore River Staging Area in Quincy, argued just the opposite: Quincy deserved the MWRA in particular, they claimed, far more than Roxbury did. The Quincy site was already owned by the MWRA, who had leased space to General Dynamics until that firm closed its operations there in 1986. Second, the MWRA had chosen to locate a sludge treatment plant in Quincy, and the town deserved the compensation of hosting the headquarters as well. The agency should be "giving something back to Quincy," said state Senator Paul Harold, the main spokesperson for Quincy's interests.¹²

The first political threat from the Quincy supporters came from U.S. Representative Brian Donnelly of Quincy. On March 6, Representative Donnelly filed a bill in Congress which would have prevented the MWRA from issuing tax-exempt bonds to finance the Boston Harbor clean-up unless the MWRA moved to Quincy. Levy said that Donnelly's bill, if passed, would raise the price of the \$6 billion harbor clean-up by an extra billion dollars and was outraged by the legislation.¹³ Donnelly's bill was more of a rallying cry, though, than a realistic threat. Shapiro had been assured by Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, that Donnelly's bill would go nowhere.¹⁴

The other, more potent action by Quincy supporters was the introduction of a bill into the state legislature by South Shore Representatives Michael Morrissey and Robert Cerasoli that required the MWRA to move to Quincy. A week later, on March 16, the bill passed the House, 113-31. Morrissey said that many legislators voted in favor of the bill because the legislature wanted some control over the MWRA's spending, and that the legislators believed that the Quincy site was cheaper because the MWRA already owned the land.

The Quincy delegation found some unexpected support from Inspector General Joseph Barresi. Barresi declared the bidding process invalid, for the developer of Parcel 18 had only been designated the developer and did not yet own the land, while the MWRA's Request for Proposal had required bidders to own their land. In response, the BRA promised that the city and state would work quickly to turn over the land to the developer.¹⁵ Shapiro said that Barresi's ruling had no effect on the Board of Directors' eventual decision and that Barresi was being a "pain in the ass" about the allegedly illegal bid.¹⁶ Still, Barresi's ruling fueled the growing sense among some legislators and local politicians that the site selection process was unfair. (As of early 1992, the developer does not yet own the land. They still cannot purchase the land until they secure private financing, and they cannot secure private financing without the guaranteed income stream from an anchor tenant.)

CHOOSING PARCEL 18

The selection decision was to be made by the MWRA's Board of Directors, which comprised eleven members: three mayoral appointees, three gubernatorial appointees, a Quincy representative, a Winthrop

representative, and three Advisory Board representatives. The Advisory Board consisted of 60 members from the communities served by the MWRA. According to Senator Harold, the presence of six Flynn and Dukakis appointees made the selection of Parcel 18 inevitable. John Carroll, an Advisory Board representative to the Board of Directors, told Harold that the decision was "rigged."¹⁷

The Boston Herald reported in early May 1989 that the developer donated thousands of dollars to Flynn's mayoral campaign fund and Dukakis's presidential campaign fund. This article ran just days before the MWRA was scheduled to make their decision, and it suggested that the Herald was supportive of Carroll's claim that the selection of Parcel 18 was predetermined and a matter of political bargaining, rather than objective decision based on technical standards.¹⁸

At the beginning of May, the staff of the MWRA asked the Board of Directors to take three sites out of consideration, including Quincy. The staff recommended that the Quincy site be dropped due to poor accessibility and increased costs from unexpected structural, asbestos, and toxic waste problems. Also, the architecture consultants had prepared a report of the sites for the MWRA in April, concluding that the Quincy site required so much renovation and preparation that it could not be ready before June 1993.¹⁹

Donnelly, Morrissey, and Harold objected immediately, charging the MWRA with overstating the problems associated with the Quincy site.²⁰ In response to this political pressure, on May 10 the MWRA Board of Directors voted to reinstate Quincy to the list of considered sites and agreed to put off the final decision until the May 24 meeting, when each developer would give a final presentation to the Board.²¹

Shapiro said that the Board of Directors decided to add Quincy to the list only because of political pressure. In fact, the MWRA staff was strongly against moving to Quincy. Shapiro said that seventy-seven percent of the MWRA's employees would face a much worse commute if the MWRA moved to Quincy, and he thought that in the long run most MWRA employees would leave their jobs for jobs closer to their homes, leaving the MWRA to hire a new staff. He said that the MWRA never considered Quincy a realistic option because of its inaccessibility and the cost of renovation.²²

The political support for Quincy was so strong because the town of Quincy was large and had a powerful business community, and the fairness argument of the headquarters as compensation for the loss of sludge-treatment plant appealed to many. According to Shapiro, state legislators and Barresi knew too little about development to understand that rehabilitating an old building could be more expensive than building a new one.²³

While the public debate focused on Parcel 18 versus Quincy, the MWRA's choice was in fact between Parcel 18 and Fort Point Place. Only those two sites could be ready in time and were adequately accessible by public transportation -- Parcel 18 on the Orange Line, and Fort Point Place near South Station and on the Waterfront.²⁴ On May 24, the MWRA Board of Directors voted 9-2 to select Parcel 18. Carroll and MacRitchie opposed the motion, and everyone else, including all of Flynn's and Dukakis's appointees and three of the five non-political appointees, supported the motion.

Parcel 18 fit most of the criteria that the MWRA listed in its Request for Proposal. The developer did expect the building to be ready for occupancy by June 1991. The space and facilities requirements were easy to meet because the structure would be built to suit the MWRA's particular specifications.

Parcel 18 had the best location, both for public transportation and road access, providing employees the easiest commute. The proximity of Parcel 18 to three universities would have allowed for easy training of new employees, and the \$1.4 million in linkage payments from the developer were earmarked for job training programs for MWRA employees. And when the developer's concessions during negotiations were included, the cost of Parcel 18 was competitive with, if not lower than, the costs of the other options.²⁵

At the end of May, it seemed as though the issue was resolved. According to Shapiro, the MWRA might have had to fight a legal battle against the Inspector General's office before the developer could build, but the MWRA was confident that their site selection process was complete.²⁶ The MWRA Board's resolution set the occupancy date for June 30, 1991, required 250 parking spaces above ground, and asked for a twenty-year lease with purchase options after three and ten years. The developer lowered the cost by reducing the space and cutting \$2 million off tenant improvements, and a month later Massachusetts offered a \$3 million subsidy in its Off-Street Parking Grant program.²⁷

The MWRA Board of Directors had some reservations about Parcel 18, however. The MWRA feared that the cooperation of numerous state and municipal agencies and departments would be necessary for the transfer and development of Parcel 18, perhaps delaying the process greatly. Shapiro expressed his hesitation in "being pioneers" in the Ruggles Street neighborhood, and he lamented the lack of shops and restaurants that would make work more convenient for the headquarters' 900 employees.²⁸ These concerns echoed some of the reasons that private tenants were reluctant to move to Parcel 18, which had necessitated the need to find a public agency as anchor tenant in the first place.

FIGHTING AT THE STATEHOUSE

The political battle resumed in the summer of 1989. In the beginning of June, the Senate gave the bill forcing the MWRA to move to Quincy initial approval by a 20-16 vote, undaunted by the MWRA's decision to locate at Parcel 18. Senator Harold introduced the bill in the Senate, and he accused Dukakis of threatening legislators with funding cuts unless they voted against Harold's bill.²⁹

The MWRA staff then estimated an additional cost increase to ratepayers of \$315 million if the MWRA were forced to move to Quincy, for the MWRA's credit rating would fall dramatically if the legislature overturned the Board of Directors' decision. According to the staff, the legislature's action would have set a dangerous precedent for future interference with the actions of independent authorities. Harold retorted that the increased cost from the lowered credit rating if the MWRA moved to Quincy would be far less than the increased cost in having to issue taxable bonds (per Donnelly's federal legislation) if the MWRA moved to Roxbury.³⁰ Harold also said that the MWRA often "cries wolf" by appealing to its credit rating.³¹

It might seem surprising that the bill received so much support in the Senate: the MWRA had already decided to move to Parcel 18, and the heated political debate on the bill in the House was already three months old. Yet a Globe editorial gave the reasons for the bill's popularity:

[A] vote for Quincy is a vote against the state's most unpopular governor since Thomas Gage (the last royal governor and the 'victor' at the Battle of Bunker Hill), against the city's mayor (who, by definition, is always unpopular on Beacon Hill), and

against the most unpopular state agency since the Registry of Motor Vehicles cleaned up its act.³²

Pinado, representing the developer, agreed. She said that the worst thing that happened to Parcel 18 was when Dukakis announced he would not seek reelection. As a lame-duck governor, "he became a detriment," since the development was perceived as Dukakis's pet project and politicians were eager to score points against him.³³

A Herald editorial explained and echoed the unpopularity of the MWRA. The state judiciary had ordered the creation of the MWRA in 1984 after the legislature's long-standing inability to raise enough revenue to cover the clean-up of Boston Harbor. The MWRA was created with the freedom to raise water rates without legislative approval, while the public has "been limited to watching, powerlessly, as one mishap after another has surfaced at the MWRA." The Herald "almost welcomed the political feud, which has at least brought elected officials back into the picture," though the editorial criticized the "impropriety" of Dukakis's lobbying for his own campaign contributors.³⁴

Adding to the complication, at the end of June, the state Department of Labor and Industries (DLI) supported Barresi's claim that the MWRA could not sign a contract with MCPV without the approval of the state legislature. This opinion was based on state bidding laws, established in 1980 by the Ward Commission, that preclude state agencies from leasing property from developers who did not use a public bidding process to select its designers. Levy and Dukakis denounced the report as based on a legal technicality that did not address the merits of the sites and would not be supported in court.³⁵ But Shapiro, who had brushed off both Donnelly's legislation and Barresi's ruling as unimportant, saw this threat as quite potent. He said that the DLI's

claim could easily result in an extensive lawsuit that might interfere with the tight schedule of construction and development at Parcel 18.³⁶

Attorney General James Shannon agreed to enforce the DLI's ruling if the MWRA continued its plans to move to Parcel 18. The DLI and Shannon's support was crucial because Barresi had no power of enforcement, said Senator Harold. Typically, continued Harold, state legislators listened to Barresi's advice and proceeded just as they originally had planned.³⁷

Thus two offices under Dukakis, the DLI and the (separately elected) Attorney General, worked against his goal to develop Parcel 18. Senator Harold explained that the MWRA's selection of Parcel 18 "was in violation of every safeguard [the legislature] put in" to prevent independent agencies from incurring excessive costs. The infringement was so blatant, said Harold, and the case under so much media and public scrutiny, that the DLI and Shannon had no choice but to support Barresi's objections.³⁸

Dukakis admitted that "there was language in the statute that was troubling and raised questions." But, he said, the idea of using a state agency as a lead tenant was not new. In his first term as governor (1974-1978) he had required state branch offices to locate in old downtown areas "to serve as stimuli" for economic growth. Above all, he thought Barresi narrow in his argument: "the Inspector General did not recognize the social and community benefits that would come from this."³⁹

Senator Harold's bill passed both chambers on June 29.⁴⁰ Shapiro noted that most of the political actors in the state took a stand on the MWRA siting issue with the exception of black politicians from Roxbury and neighboring areas. He said that it was therefore never clear to him how important the siting issue actually was to Roxbury.⁴¹ Only in early July, after the bill already passed the House and the Senate, did the Globe report a

statement by a black politician for the first time during the entire issue. Representative Byron Rushing of the South End was lobbying "almost full time," along with seven other House members and MCPV partners. But opponents of the bill from other areas, such as Senator Michael Barrett of Cambridge, were surprised at how little effort black legislators put in to fighting the bill. Senator William Owens of Roxbury, for instance, was "conspicuously unengaged" when he could have been pressuring Senate President William Bulger to be more vocal in his support of Roxbury.⁴²

Reverend Bethel recalled that the Roxbury community thought Roxbury legislators, notably Owens, "took a passive role." Bethel said that Roxbury legislators acted as if the MWRA's selection of Parcel 18 "were a done deal" and did not take Quincy's challenge seriously.⁴³ Three sources, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, charged that Senator Owens did not fight for Parcel 18 because of his connections to the Boston Development Collaborative, one of the minority partnerships not chosen to develop Parcel 18. Calling Owens's actions a "personal vendetta" and "sour grapes," these sources said that the lack of Owens's support was much less a class battle between rich developers and a poor community's representatives than a personal conflict between supporters of competing minority development interests.

While black politicians were quiet, Globe columnist Derrick Jackson and some legislators brought the charge of racism into the battle. They charged Quincy supporters with portraying the MWRA's selection of Parcel 18 as a "handout," and the minority developers as "welfare bums."⁴⁴ However, Reverend Bethel thought Quincy's challenge was economically, not racially, motivated. He said that Quincy's legislators were under pressure to bring jobs to Quincy and to find an occupant for the vacant Shipyard.⁴⁵

Raine agreed, saying that he was "sympathetic" to Quincy's interests and did not believe South Shore legislators were malicious in their objection to the MWRA's selection of Parcel 18.⁴⁶

ATTEMPTS AT COMPROMISE

Dukakis vetoed the bill on July 11. He then filed a compromise bill with the support of Boston and South Shore legislators and community leaders from Roxbury and Quincy. Harold said that he agreed to this compromise because he did not have enough votes in the House to override Dukakis's veto.⁴⁷ Dukakis's compromise stipulated that most MWRA employees would go to Roxbury and that the MWRA would hire a private developer to rehabilitate the former General Dynamics building on the Quincy site to house some MWRA sludge-oversight staff and other state agencies. Most importantly, the bill "specifically authorize[d] the MWRA to execute its proposed lease at Parcel 18." This satisfied the DLI's objection to Parcel 18 because the state bidding laws allow the legislature to exempt specific projects from these laws.⁴⁸ South Shore legislators accepted this proposal and added that they would be content with any environmental agency coming to Quincy, not just the MWRA.⁴⁹

However, the compromise bill was "shot down in a surprise midnight uprising by angry legislators within the MWRA district not aligned with either Roxbury or Quincy interests." Many legislators feared that rates would rise further to cover this (allegedly) more expensive compromise and questioned whether the possible bidding law violation could be so easily overlooked. The House "shot down" the compromise bill by voting to postpone the vote on the override of Dukakis's veto of the original bill, which had to be defeated before the compromise bill could be acted on. The

override vote was postponed until September 11, when the legislature would return from recess, leaving the MWRA's Board of Directors still unsure whether they would be able to sign a contract with MCPV.⁵⁰

During the earlier months of the controversy, Shapiro and the Roxbury legislators played down the impact of Congressman Donnelly's federal legislation and Barresi's ruling. By the end of July, however, the Globe reported that the controversy over the headquarters could interfere with the MWRA's ability to clean up Boston Harbor, for the MWRA might either have to enter a lawsuit to challenge the DLI's ruling, issue taxable bonds, or face a lowered credit rating. A federal judge promised that if the clean-up were delayed, the federal government would take over the clean-up, giving the public less influence over the process. Many legislators believed with Senator Harold that the MWRA "lack[ed] the political sensitivity of other independent state authorities," and that the current controversy was a sign that the legislature should restructure the MWRA and take more control over its operations."⁵¹

When the legislature resumed in September, the compromise bill was delayed for two weeks to research the legality of the bill in light of the DLI's objection based on the bidding laws. The Commissioner of the DLI, James Snow, wrote a letter to the Chairperson of the Joint Committee on State Administration, Representative Joseph Hermann, telling him that "enactment [of the compromise legislation] would eliminate the current legal impediment to locating the MWRA headquarters at Parcel 18."⁵² Levy sent the other chairperson, Senator Michael Creedon, a letter asking for early consideration of the compromise bill.⁵³ Two supporters of the bill also sent to other legislators a list of past legislative actions that served as precedents for

authorizing "alternative construction methods" rather than following state bidding laws."⁵⁴

But days later, Barresi testified at the Joint Committee on State Administration that "the exemption of two major public construction projects from the Ward Commission reforms would invite waste and abuse on both projects." He criticized the compromise bill for costing ratepayers more money and making a mockery of bidding laws. He again claimed that the costs of the Quincy site were overstated, and he charged the MWRA with "inventing" the criterion of "'stimulation of community revitalization'" for its selection process.⁵⁵ Barresi's objection prompted Representative Hermann to postpone making a recommendation on the bill until Barresi and the bill's supporters could agree on a resolution.⁵⁶

This stalemate lasted for two more weeks. The BRA and the developer then offered to support legislation to appease Barresi. That new compromise guaranteed that an unspecified state agency would lease 150,000 square feet at Parcel 18, 60,000 less than what the MWRA would lease, and would allow the MWRA headquarters to go to Quincy. This offer was the first time that either the developer, the city, or the state was willing to accept an agreement that did not require the MWRA headquarters to go to Roxbury. Senator Harold and Representative Hermann said that given this concession, a solution seemed likely. However, four days later Barresi refused to support this new compromise, arguing that it was too similar to the previous compromise and therefore still violated state bidding laws.⁵⁷

THE MWRA THINKS AGAIN

On October 25, the MWRA took its first step away from its May decision to locate in Parcel 18. Levy, the MWRA's Executive Director,

recommended to the Board that the MWRA renew its lease in the Charlestown Navy Yard. He said that he doubted whether the legislature would be able to pass a compromise bill that would prevent a lawsuit and allow the Parcel 18 developer to have the facility available by June 1991. Levy blamed Barresi's stubbornness for the difficulty that MCPV would have in completing the building on time.

Shapiro explained that under the current lease, if the MWRA stayed at the Charlestown site after the lease expired, the penalty would be a 100% rent increase until the MWRA moved or signed a new lease. Therefore, timing was a crucial factor in Levy's recommendation to stay in Charlestown. Board members voted to postpone action on Levy's recommendation in order to give the legislature a chance to permit the move to Parcel 18. At this point, the Advisory Board reported that the legislature did have the power to force the MWRA to Quincy unless the MWRA tried to "regain the initiative." So even though the decision was delayed, the pressure was on the Board of Directors to decide whether to fight for Parcel 18 or not.⁵⁸

The Board of Directors favored tabling Levy's resolution to wait and see what action the legislature would take.⁵⁹ Days later, on October 30, Senator Francis Doris of Charlestown became the first legislator to speak out in favor of the MWRA's staying in Charlestown. He said that he could support none of the compromise bills, for all threatened to raise the cost to the ratepayer higher than if the MWRA simply moved to Parcel 18 or stayed in Charlestown. Senator Owens of Roxbury joined Senator Doris in his objection to Barresi's compromise, but Senator Harold criticized Senator Doris for claiming that the MWRA was important to Charlestown. None of the compromise bills received the recommendation of the Joint Committee on State Administration.⁶⁰

Four weeks later, the House voted against overriding Dukakis's veto of the original bill that had been designed to force the MWRA to move to Quincy. While this alone would have allowed the MWRA to follow its May decision to move to Parcel 18, MWRA spokesperson Paul DiNatale said that the MWRA would not challenge the DLI's charge that the MWRA could not legally award the contract to Parcel 18. The override vote was 96-55, only five votes short of successfully overturning Dukakis's veto, so the MWRA thought it unlikely that it could get enough support in the legislature for a challenge of the DLI. According to Senator Harold, the bill would have passed had House Speaker George Keverian not opposed the override, in order to punish Representatives Cerasoli and Morrissey for voting against the House leadership on an earlier tax bill.⁶¹ The only piece left in the story, then, was the Board of Directors' action on Levy's recommendation to stay in Charlestown in light of the failed override and the risk of a court challenge.

The Board of Directors had postponed their decision until their meeting on January 3, 1990. At that meeting the discussion began with another motion to postpone the decision further, but this time that motion failed, and the Board then voted 6-4 to accept Levy's recommendation to renew the lease at the Charlestown Navy Yard until June 2001. Those voting against included two of Flynn's appointees and one of Dukakis's appointees, as well as MacRitchie, the Quincy representative. The third Flynn appointee was absent. The other two Dukakis appointees, the three Advisory Board appointees, and the Winthrop representative all voted in favor of the motion. The politically appointed representatives did not, therefore, act in unison as they had in previous votes, indicating that the decision to remain in Charlestown was less a matter of politics than of practicality.⁶²

Some of the Board members who voted to stay in Charlestown had voted in May to move to Parcel 18. They explained their reversal by arguing that the MWRA was losing the public's confidence in its ability to act; that continuing to push for Parcel 18 might be "very damaging to the Authority" as it attempts to issue bonds; and that the matter had been discussed "to death."⁶³ Levy was less apologetic, though, and asserted that timing was a crucial factor in this decision, for if the MWRA were to move it would need assurance that the building would be ready by June 1991. That prospect was becoming less and less likely as the months passed.

Not surprisingly, nearly every other actor expressed disappointment, resentment, or outrage. The BRA was "very disappointed" and had already begun to search for another agency to commit to moving into Parcel 18. Senator Harold warned that the legislature was prepared to examine the MWRA's independence and threatened greater legislative interference in the future. Barresi charged that the MWRA should have negotiated a better deal in Charlestown or found a cheaper site. A Herald editorial charged the MWRA with wasting ratepayers money.⁶⁴ But this time, the Board of Directors' decision was final.⁶⁵

The battle over Parcel 18 brought into conflict mutually exclusive, but not opposite, interests. Both the Quincy legislators and the supporters of Parcel 18 had strong reasons other than technical merit to host the MWRA's headquarters. Senator Harold insisted that he and other South Shore legislators were supportive of parcel-to-parcel linkage, and did "recognize the need for development in Parcel 18."⁶⁶ The developer, too, understood that the controversy was not directed against them. Said Pinado, "we picked the wrong state agency," and "Dukakis hurt us" by announcing he would not seek reelection.⁶⁷ Recall Raine's sympathy for Quincy's position; he was far

more angry at Barresi than at Senator Harold and called Barresi the "single most destructive force against economic development in Massachusetts."⁶⁸

The battle over the MWRA was an aberration in the generally consensual politics of Parcel 18. Said Dukakis of the development, "apart from the objections of the people in Quincy, everybody thought this made sense."⁶⁹ Even the objections of Senator Harold and Inspector General Barresi were not directed against the redistributive aspects of the project per se. Senator Harold and other Quincy supporters thought that the MWRA owed Quincy compensation for locating the sludge-treatment plant there: their argument was specific to that particular town and that particular agency. Barresi's concern was the circumvention of the bidding laws, a legislative technicality, and his rivalry with Dukakis fueled his opposition. The Parcel 18 project was set back much less by ideological opposition than by popular and personal resentment against two of the project's strongest allies, Dukakis and the MWRA.

CHAPTER FIVE: PARCEL 18 UNLINKED?

During the MWRA controversy, the planning for Parcel 18 continued. The BRA, the developer, and the Parcel 18 Task Force negotiated plans that did not depend on the MWRA as the anchor tenant. Although the timing of the planning process coincided with the MWRA's selection of Parcel 18, the plan for development remained in place even after the MWRA decided to stay in Charlestown. Though legislative controversy resurfaced in 1990, it was again more a matter of personal conflict rather than ideological opposition to the development. The real obstacle to development was the late 1980's office bust. The lack of demand for downtown space at the end of the decade effectively "unlinked" the project, in that One Lincoln Street (the downtown project) became less viable than Ruggles Center. These economic conditions interfered with the development of Parcel 18 and have reshaped the project, at least temporarily.

THE FORMAL AGREEMENTS

On June 29, 1989, the BRA Board of Directors approved the developer's Master Plan for Parcel 18, which since that time has been called "Ruggles Center." The BRA Board ordered Director Coyle to draw up the subsequent agreements regarding community benefits and the sale of the land. Months later, the BRA, the developer, and the community groups signed the Memorandum of Understanding, which outlined the community benefits package that the developer would provide. These two documents, the Master Plan and the Memorandum of Understanding, continued to be the official planning documents for the project in the early 1990's.

The Master Plan for Ruggles Center included three office buildings with ground level retail space, a hotel of approximately 200 rooms, and a

parking garage. The plan called for an outdoor landscaped plaza leading up to the Ruggles station. The three office buildings would contain a total of 650,000 to 725,000 square feet of office space and 45,000 to 55,000 square feet of retail space, with the hotel adding another 180,000 to 190,000 square feet of floor area. The developer sought designation for the land as a Planned Development Area, which would have rezoned the area for more intensive use. The zoning code expressed permissible development in terms of floor area ratio (FAR), which is the ratio of the number of gross indoor square feet to the number of square feet of land. For instance, a 2,000 square foot house on a quarter-acre plot has an FAR of $2,000/10,890$, or .18. The zoning code limited the FAR over most of the site to 1.0, whereas the Master Plan required an FAR of 5.5 to permit 1,220,000 square feet of office, hotel, and retail space on the 5.1 acre plot. The Zoning Commission approved this redesignation on September 13.¹

Unlike the BRA's 1986 plans for Parcel 18, the Master Plan for Ruggles Center did not include housing. MCPV excluded housing from the preliminary designs it submitted to the BRA in July 1988. According to BRA officials, neighbors of Parcel 18 requested that the required linkage housing be built off-site.² Also, the BRA and the developer expected that the land could probably attract enough office and retail space that housing would have not been the most profitable use of the land, and the BRA planned instead to put housing on the neighboring Parcel 22.³

The Master Plan provided for the construction of Ruggles Center in four phases. Phase I included a public plaza, a parking garage, and the office building that would house the anchor tenant. Together these parts of Phase I covered 3 acres of the 5.1-acre site. The developer proposed to begin Phase I in October 1989 and complete the office building by June 1991.⁴ The projected

office rents for Phase I were to be \$20.42/square foot, and space built in the later phases was expected to command approximately \$30/square foot. The return on total development cost would be 8.2% with a cash-on-cash return of 4.3%. These projected returns were quite similar to those projected in 1986 (8.3% and 5.4%, respectively); the small decline was attributable primarily to a greater equity requirement in financing and the absence of a federal UDAG.⁵ These calculations also reflected the absence of the \$25 million in state housing assistance and the absence of the approximately \$40 million subsidy for foundation and site preparation.

The second major document establishing the plan for Parcel 18 was the Memorandum of Understanding. This agreement outlined the community benefits package that the developer would provide. It was signed in September 1989 by the BRA, the developer, and the Parcel 18 and Chinatown Task Forces. MCPV had agreed to a general community benefits package when they competed to be the developer, so this agreement grew out of the understanding between the signatories over a year earlier. Both Chinatown and Roxbury got linkage funds from each half of the development.

The first major community benefit was that Ruggles Center and One Lincoln Street would each contribute linkage payments of \$4.3 million for housing and \$900,000 for job training, subject to changes in design plans.⁶ The agreement divided the housing linkage funds from each building equally between Parcel 22 in Roxbury and a parcel of land in the South Cove area of Chinatown. The jobs linkage payment was also to be distributed one-half to each community.

The second major community benefit was the Community Development Fund. From One Lincoln Street the developer would pay into this fund 10% of the developer's fee, \$2 million at the time a building permit

was secured and \$800,000 per year for the ten years after the building permit date. From Ruggles Center, the developer would pay 10% of the developer's fee, 5% of net operating income, 10% of net refinancing proceeds, and 10% of net resale proceeds. The One Lincoln Street payments would be distributed one-third to Roxbury, one-third to Chinatown, and one-third in a competition to the city's neighborhoods; the Ruggles Street payments would be distributed one-half each to Roxbury and Chinatown. The bulk of the redistributive effects of parcel-to-parcel linkage was to come from this community benefits package. Because the revenue from each half of the project would be divided between Roxbury and Chinatown, Roxbury would benefit from the large revenues that One Lincoln Street would generate.

never
avail

Third, the Memorandum of Understanding also set aside jobs, "to the best of the respective contractor's ability," for city residents, women, and minorities. The construction forces would be 50% Boston residents, 30% minorities, and 10% women. The developer would then "pursue as a goal" a permanent workforce at the two sites of 50% Boston residents, 30% minorities, and 50% women. In each community, the developer would also provide child-care facilities for one hundred children or pay a lump-sum to the city for that purpose.

Fourth, to benefit minority businesses, the Memorandum of Understanding required the developer to use its "best faith efforts" to hire at least 30% minority contractors related to develop the project, and to lease at least 30% of the retail space to neighborhood-based and minority businesses. The agreement also provided for a business incubator program, technical assistance to new businesses, and grants for encouraging minorities in real estate. Finally, the agreement required Columbia Plaza Associates, the minority developer, to sell ten percent of the interest in CPA to non-profit

community-based groups.⁷ The developer projected the cash benefits as totalling \$26 million, most of which would go to Chinatown and Roxbury.⁸

STILL TRYING TO ATTRACT THE PRIVATE SECTOR

During the MWRA controversy, Mayor Flynn gave the development of Parcel 18 an additional boost. On May 25, 1989, the day after the MWRA selected Parcel 18, Flynn announced his desire to consider moving the Boston police headquarters and fire headquarters to Parcel 22. He delayed this announcement in order not to be criticized for biasing the MWRA's process.⁹ A Globe editorial praised Flynn for this proposal, even though the editorial perceived the move as more symbolic than practical.¹⁰

Moving police headquarters next to Parcel 18 drove at the major reservation potential tenants had about moving to Ruggles Center: the fear of crime. A member of the development team said that "dozens" of potential tenants had cited crime as the reason they stopped considering Ruggles.¹¹ The Herald referred to a "wave of violence in the surrounding neighborhood" that hurt the effort to find a new anchor tenant.¹² Altshuler explained that security costs would be much higher at Ruggles Center than elsewhere, and that this additional cost might eliminate Parcel 18 from consideration by potential tenants.¹³

Both the BRA's Johnson and Reverend Bethel blamed local media coverage for an unrealistic public perception of Parcel 18 as dangerous. Said Reverend Bethel, "people must come and see" that the area is safe, and the public perception of Ruggles Center would change as soon as the first employees began to move in.¹⁴ Johnson added that she expected the "absorption of [the public perception of] the Southwest Corridor into [that of] Huntington Avenue," a neighboring road where the Museum of Fine Arts,

the Longwood Medical Center, Symphony Hall, and Copley Place are located.¹⁵ Pinado said that once construction of the new headquarters began, private tenants might take interest. However, since the police headquarters was only in the planning stages, no new tenants came forward.¹⁶

The perception of Parcel 18 as dangerous led the developer and the BRA quietly to dissociate Parcel 18 from Roxbury. In a marketing brochure, the developer referred to Parcel 18 as part of Back Bay, a then-booming commercial and retail area with upper-income residents.¹⁷ Also, in its annual office market report the BRA redrew the boundary of the Class A office market to include Parcel 18. The boundary of the market therefore included a long, thin panhandle to allow the inclusion of Parcel 18. (See Map 7.) Unfortunately, this affirmative gerrymandering had little effect on attracting an anchor tenant.¹⁸ It also reflected a contradiction in the development of Parcel 18: the community benefits package tied Parcel 18 tightly to the Roxbury community, while the need for investment required downplaying Parcel 18's Roxbury location.

In fact, the developer has never had a serious private tenant. While parcel-to-parcel linkage made it easier to find a developer for less attractive land, linkage had "zero effect on getting tenants." Pinado said that the only exception to this had been that a couple of potential tenants had become interested in participating in the project for its political and public relations benefits. In fact, apart from public agencies, the developer expected only private medical and educational institutions to become major tenants in the project. All along, said Pinado, the developer had kept in contact with several public agencies whose leases were nearing expiration. But after the MWRA battle it knew that the next step was to push legislation that would allow it to circumvent state bidding procedures and get a state agency as anchor tenant.¹⁹

BACK TO THE STATEHOUSE

In response, in May 1990 the BLC filed a House bill in the state legislature allowing an as-yet-unspecified state agency to enter a fifteen-year lease at Ruggles Center outside the normal competitive-bidding process. According to a BRA official, state agencies were normally prohibited from entering into leases for more than five years. But the BLC's bill specified a fifteen-year lease period because in the shaky financial market of 1990 no bank would have financed the project without a tenant guaranteed for at least fifteen years.²⁰

The developer and Flynn lobbied hard for the BLC's bill. The Globe and Herald reported that Flynn and Keverian had struck a deal by which Keverian would give the bill his support if Flynn endorsed Keverian for state treasurer at the upcoming state Democratic convention. Also, Representative Morrissey, who had introduced the House bill forcing the MWRA to move to Quincy a year before, threatened to oppose the bill unless it also required the MWRA to move to Quincy.²¹ Senator Harold said that Morrissey had little support for this move, however, since once the MWRA had voted to remain in Charlestown the South Shore legislators considered the issue closed.²²

Reverend Bethel called the bill non-controversial.²³ Indeed, with the exception of Morrissey, the bill gained overwhelming support. When the Joint Committee on Housing and Urban Development conducted hearings, no one testified against it. Dukakis praised it, and Flynn added that it was particularly urgent because the federal government had removed support for many urban programs and that the state therefore needed to step in to take responsibility.²⁴ The Globe ran an editorial urging passage of the bill so as not to forgo the private investment that would follow the public commitment to

developing Ruggles Center.²⁵ The bill passed the House Ways and Means Committee on July 5, and two weeks later House minority leader (and gubernatorial hopeful) Steven Pierce endorsed it, which virtually guaranteed its passage.²⁶

As the House vote on the bill approached, Flynn announced that the police headquarters would be built on Parcel 22. He carefully timed this announcement to attract attention to the Parcel 18 bill. On July 23, the House passed the bill 115-23. However, immediately thereafter Inspector General Barresi sent a letter opposing the bill to Senator Patricia McGovern, Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. He argued that the bill "invite[d] waste and abuse" by going "beyond the concept of an anchor tenancy." The bill permitted a state agency to lease all of the space in Ruggles Center, not just the minimum space needed for the developer to get financing. Furthermore, the bill allowed up to 25-year leases via five-year extensions of the required fifteen-year lease, and it set "no meaningful cap on the rent" that the state would pay.²⁷

As Senator Harold expected, legislators ignored Barresi. Representative Byron Rushing, a sponsor of the bill, was less surprised that Barresi objected than that he waited so long to do so. Compared to Barresi's complaints about the MWRA's decision, Rushing even considered this objection auspicious: "At least he's saying he buys into the concept of an anchor tenant."²⁸

However, the authors of the legislation had a second, more potent challenge to face: Senator Owens. According to Reverend Bethel, the developer and the Task Force urged Owens to push the bill through four days after the House passed it, before the Senate recessed. But while Owens circulated a press release claiming that he got the bill "to third reading and

near final passage," Bethel said that even after the Senate resumed in September Owens let the bill slide.²⁹

The reason for Owens's slackness did not begin to emerge until December 8, when he opened the bill for amendment and sparked the second legislative battle over Ruggles Center. He proposed an amendment with the following changes: first, the community trust fund would be administered by two committees, one for Chinatown and one for Roxbury, on which state legislators (including Owens) would sit; second, the developer would have to pay 10% of gross income, rather than 5% of net operating income, from the Ruggles Center project to the community trust fund; third, the community trust fund payments from One Lincoln Street would be divided evenly between Chinatown and Roxbury, rather than split three ways between Chinatown, Roxbury, and the city at large; and fourth, the developer would put an additional \$1 million per year for sixteen years into the community trust fund, to be divided evenly between Roxbury and Chinatown. This bill with Owens's amendment passed the Senate on December 10.³⁰

The changes in the amended bill would have superseded the agreement worked out in the Memorandum of Understanding signed a year earlier. Owens claimed to have the support of the Roxbury community for these changes, but the BLC, the Parcel 18 Task Force, and the developer were furious. The BLC sent the bill back to committee without Owens's amendment, and Representative Rushing claimed that Owens was trying to hurt the project.³¹ Bethel agreed: he said that the provision requiring the extra \$16 million would have made funding impossible to obtain.³² A source close to the developer, who asked to remain anonymous, said that Owens's amendment was "tantamount to him saying 'I want to stop the project.'"

Dukakis was also critical: "Owens' amendment didn't make any sense."³³ A Globe editorial chided, "There will be no profits if the land remains vacant."³⁴

Muhammad Abdus-Sabur, BRA Deputy Director of Urban Design and Development, offered another explanation for Owens's amendment. In his opinion, Owens spoke for the community on this issue, while the BLC was "networked to the developers themselves." Abdus-Sabur called Roxbury a very small community with "another kind of old-boy network" of wealthy black politicians and businesspeople. While the community is proud of them, he said, they do not always represent the community's best interests. In his view, Owens was trying to get the most possible for the community from the developer.³⁵

The split that Abdus-Sabur described -- between an established black bourgeoisie and younger, more activist leaders -- was a rivalry common in the history of Boston black politics. However, the BRA's Johnson claimed that this particular controversy did not follow that general pattern. While "the community has been suspicious of everyone," she said, they had been generally supportive of MCPV, who had gone out of its way to get community support. And some of Owens's attack was not against the developer, but rather against the BRA for having changed the proportion of One Lincoln Street funds going to Roxbury.³⁶

Weeks later, the Globe printed a small article mentioning that James Colfield, an economic adviser to Senator Owens, was a member of the Boston Development Collaborative, who competed against CPA to be selected as minority developer for the project.³⁷ This suggested that the rivalry between the two development teams had continued, and that Owens's action might be interpreted more as a fight between competing developers' interests rather than a conflict between MCPV and the Roxbury community. Bethel added

that there was also "some public perception" that Owens's action was "revengeful," that he was punishing CPA and its friends for giving him inadequate support in the recent November 1990 election.³⁸

After the BLC refused to accept Owens's amendment, black representatives negotiated over the differences between their original bill and Owens's changes. Owens gave up the requirement of the additional \$16 million payment over sixteen years to the community development fund. The developer objected to Owens's other changes, too, but after the \$16 million payment was dropped, on December 19 the legislature passed the bill with Owens's three other changes intact.³⁹

However, Dukakis returned the bill two days later with further changes. The developer argued that the requirement of Owens's amendment for 10% of gross income to be paid to the community trust fund before the second mortgage and other investors were paid was a restriction that would have made private financing impossible to obtain. Accordingly, Dukakis changed the requirement to 10% of net operating income. He also changed the fund administration committee to a single board for both Roxbury and Chinatown. The developer, Flynn, and City Councillor Bolling all supported Dukakis's changes.⁴⁰

After further negotiation with Owens, the legislature passed a final version of the bill on December 28 that Dukakis signed the next day. In addition to allowing a state agency to lease space at Ruggles Center for at least fifteen and up to twenty-five years, the bill included three major provisions: first, Owens's proposal that separate committees would administer the funds for Roxbury and Chinatown and that the state legislators from Roxbury (that is, Owens himself) would sit on the Roxbury committee; second, Dukakis's proposal that 10% of net operating income, rather than gross income, from

Ruggles Center would go into the community trust fund; and third, a compromise between Owens and the BRA which would split the first \$1 million payment from One Lincoln Street between Chinatown and Roxbury and the last \$9 million three ways between Chinatown, Roxbury, and a citywide fund.⁴¹

The BRA's Johnson said that because of the increase in the payment of net operating income from 5% to 10% and because of the change in the distribution of One Lincoln Street payments, Owens's amendment brought Roxbury more control over the money and "ultimately helped the community."⁴² Reverend Bethel, however, believed Owens's major interest in proposing the amendment was to set up the separate trust funds and determine their composition. The Memorandum of Understanding, he said, was already a legal document. Thus Owens's amendment "did nothing more to guarantee community funds; all it did was make it nearly impossible to get a lease."⁴³

NO MORE LOOKING FOR TENANTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES

After the bill passed, the developer was free to negotiate leases with state agencies without threat of objection from the Inspector General. They had been discussing deals quietly with state agencies since 1988 and had been particularly interested in the Registry of Motor Vehicles all along since its lease at Nashua Street in the city would be expiring. Shortly after Governor William Weld took office in 1991, Mayor Flynn wrote him a letter encouraging him to consider Parcel 18 as the new home for the Department of Environmental Planning or the Registry of Motor Vehicles, two agencies whose leases would expire in the next few months.⁴⁴ In February, the

Globe reported that Weld was receptive to Flynn and eager to help the development of Parcel 18.⁴⁵

In April, Weld confirmed his desire to push the Registry for Ruggles Center. He continued to meet with Flynn and the developer, and on May 21 he signed a preliminary agreement for the Registry to take occupancy of the first Ruggles Center building in 1993.⁴⁶ The Globe was predictably enthusiastic: "The administration is to be commended for not letting the economic crisis sidetrack a development that will yield long-term benefits to both Roxbury and the Registry."⁴⁷ Said another editorial, "the Ruggles Center struggle shows that when government has the will, it has the ability to leverage its resources to improve the economic prospects of thousands of people."⁴⁸ But the government's "will," though necessary, would prove not to be sufficient to achieve the redistributive goals of Parcel 18 -- even though its "will" was enough to plan the development of the project..

MCPV and the state Division of Capital Planning and Operation negotiated the minimum lease required by the 1990 bill. The lease guaranteed the developer income equal to its operating expenses, including its construction loan payments. The developer would also not pay any community benefits unless the project's revenue was high enough to provide the developer with a return of five percentage points over the cost of the construction loan.⁴⁹ Initial annual rent would be \$17.50 per square foot per year, rising to \$22 in year 6, and to \$28.50 in year 10. The Registry would lease 165,000 square feet, and construction would begin in the spring of 1992. Governor Weld signed the lease on November 14, 1991.⁵⁰

With the Registry signed on as an anchor tenant, the developer will now build Phase I of the project, which includes one office building, the parking garage, and the public plaza. Phase I of the project will be entirely

privately financed. As of early 1992, the developer was choosing between two construction loans from Bank of Boston and Fleet/Norstar. The permanent loan, which together with equity will be used to pay back the construction loan, will come from Property Capital Associates, a real estate pension fund adviser. Of this \$26 million permanent loan, \$10 million will come from the Boston District Council of Carpenters pension fund, a client of Property Capital Associates. The union stands to benefit from the carpentry jobs created during the construction of the project. The rest of the permanent loan will come from other state and union pension funds.⁵¹

FALLING SHORT OF EXPECTATIONS

With the signing of the Registry, the project has found new critics. The Globe reported that there is a significant "extra cost of relocating" the Registry to Roxbury because downtown rents have dropped below the minimum rent guaranteed to Ruggles Center in the 1990 bill and because downtown market rents are expected to rise more slowly than the rent agreed to for the Registry.⁵² Juan-Carlos Loveluck, BRA Project Manager for Urban Design and Development, said that the Registry could have had cheaper space, but not while satisfying the agency's criteria of on-site parking, transit access, and a Boston location.⁵³ Altshuler suggested that the correct measure of a fair rent for the Registry to pay is not the rents in buildings comparable to Ruggles Center, but rather the rents in the third-rate space that state agencies usually occupy. He guessed that a state agency would be able to rent less desirable space downtown for \$10 per square foot, and he said that the Registry rent should be seen as a subsidy by taxpayers to cover the cost of developing Parcel 18.⁵⁴

I asked him not to
quote me

A February 1992 Globe article reported that premium downtown office space is renting for only \$25-30 per square foot, while the downtown average is only about \$15 per square foot.⁵⁵ This average for downtown is below the \$17.50 that the Registry will pay for Parcel 18. The director of real estate management for the state Division of Capital Planning and Operations said that the 1990 legislation "circumscribed how his office could calculate a fair market rent" for Ruggles Center.⁵⁶ To the extent that the rent charged the Registry is above the market rate, Barresi's warning that the 1990 legislation did not safeguard against excessive rent may come true. As office market rents in Boston have fallen, guaranteeing the developer a minimum return over construction costs has become relatively more expensive.

While the Registry will enable the development of Parcel 18 to begin, it represents an anchor tenant less desirable than either a private anchor tenant or the MWRA. A private anchor tenant would have avoided the political controversy and legislative involvement that the MWRA sparked and the Registry required. Alternatively, the MWRA might have brought benefits to the project that the Registry probably will not. The Registry is a smaller agency, and it will lease only 165,000 square feet instead of the MWRA's planned 240,000.⁵⁷ The Registry will move 550 permanent jobs to Parcel 18 while the MWRA would have brought 900.⁵⁸ Raine insisted that it is hard to quantify and compare the economic benefits that each agency would bring to Roxbury. Still, he considered the MWRA more desirable than the Registry because the MWRA was a growing, high-visibility agency that might have brought some associated consultants to Roxbury. The MWRA headquarters would have brought higher-technology jobs to Roxbury than the Registry would, and it might have recruited at the vocational and technical schools around Parcel 18.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the Registry will bring more of the

public to Parcel 18 than the MWRA would have. This traffic may create a greater demand for ancillary services than the MWRA would have.

More generally, though, the Boston office market bust has altered the meaning of parcel-to-parcel linkage. Because of the excess supply of office space downtown, the developer has put off the plans for One Lincoln Street indefinitely. Now, the developer hopes to begin that development by the turn of the century.⁶⁰ No longer will excessive profits from One Lincoln Street justify to the developer the small return on Ruggles Center, nor can Roxbury depend on the significant portion of the community trust fund that would have come from One Lincoln Street. Said Millett, "[Parcel 18] is now more viable economically than the downtown parcel."⁶¹ And the developer said, "the Ruggles site is justifying our existence these days."⁶²

Accordingly, the plans for Ruggles Center have been scaled down. As of December 5, 1991, the BRA anticipated that the entire project will create one thousand construction jobs and two thousand permanent jobs, of which 260 construction jobs and 550 permanent jobs will accrue in Phase I (the Registry's building). Phase I development will contribute \$325,000 in housing linkage and \$65,000 in jobs linkage payments. The community trust fund will consist of only the required 10% of the developer's fee and the required 10% of net operating income. While these amounts are still to be determined, a BRA official said anonymously that they would amount to an "absurdly low number," since the bulk of the community trust fund would have come from the One Lincoln Street profits.⁶³ The developer has not released new estimates for their rates of return.

The public involvement in the project has also changed. Since the city still owns the downtown parcel, proceeds from its sale will not help finance the development of Parcel 18. The linkage payments from Phase I will be

much lower than expected. The developer will pay \$10 per square foot for the Parcel 18 land, which is only one-third of its \$7 million market value, and which therefore represents a fairly large subsidy. The state is planning to contribute \$3 million for the parking garage construction, provided that spaces are made available for public parking. The city is planning to contribute over \$2 million for the construction of the public plaza.⁶⁴ But the bulk of the public subsidy now comes from the high rent that the Registry is paying, according to Altshuler. Raine said that the developer has given up trying to lure back-office space for downtown firms and is concentrating only on back-operations space for the Longwood medical institutions.⁶⁵

Loveluck concluded that parcel-to-parcel linkage only works in a strong real estate market. He said, "I wouldn't consider it a model, [although the concept is] innovative and good." The developer agreed with Loveluck, echoing the need for a strong office market in order to reap benefits from linkage.⁶⁶

Still, parcel-to-parcel linkage succeeded in finding Parcel 18 a developer. As the developer said, without the linkage scheme it would "never go to a site like that," since "right now the land is worth nothing." Pinado admitted that other developers "were smarter than us" in that they were more skeptical of the success of the project when the developer selection process was underway. However, she said, the developer had always planned Ruggles Center to stand on its own financially because no private fund or bank would have offered financing without a guarantee that each half of the project could cover its own costs. "We would never mix two projects," Pinado said. "They both have to stand on their own." The president of the Greater Boston Real Estate Board agreed: "You cannot bank on a steady source of income from an industry as variable as commercial real estate

development."⁶⁷ Though the downtown project has stalled, the developer benefits from the publicity of linkage and considers its involvement "a positioning thing" for consideration in future Boston projects.⁶⁸

And while the project may not bring Roxbury a large community trust fund, some of the community's goals will be met. As Reverend Bethel said, "in spite of all the difficulties, it is still a model ... that defines what linkage can be, how a large city can help an outlying part achieve revitalization." He added that the community has maintained a good relationship with the developer, and the developer responded that the project brought the Roxbury community into the real estate development process.⁶⁹ Millett considered the inclusion of minorities in the developer selection process "unprecedented" and called the planning of the project "consistent with democratic ideals."⁷⁰ Bethel praised Dukakis for paving the way for Parcel 18's development: "he did all that he could plus more."⁷¹ The BRA official who coordinated the finances of the project added that the unusually high degree of cooperation between city and state agencies allowed the project to reach this point.⁷² Unfortunately for the project, the current political consensus is not enough to guarantee full project completion under a depressed office market, and full economic and community benefits may have to wait until the next downtown office boom in Boston.

CHAPTER SIX: PROGRESSIVE POLICY AND URBAN THEORY

The history of Parcel 18 presents serious difficulties for both the economic constraint theories and the political coalition theories. The economic constraint theorists offer explanations for the apparent inability of parcel-to-parcel linkage to achieve redistributive effects. But these theorists cannot explain how a truly progressive policy can be formulated in the first place. The political coalition theories can explain the formulation of progressive policy, but they are of no use in explaining why the redistributive intentions of the development of Parcel 18 have not yet resulted in real redistributive effects.

Put briefly, I argue that economic constraints affect the effects of progressive, redistributive policy more than they affect the formulation of such policy. My claim challenges political coalition theories, which focus only on policy formulation and ignore the translation of policy intentions into policy effects. Yet, my claim also challenges economic constraint theories, which extend the power of economic constraints into policy formulation and therefore deny local government's capacity even to formulate progressive policy. While each group of urban theorists offers insight into specific aspects of the history of Parcel 18, neither can provide a satisfactory account of the project as a whole. Accordingly, I will attempt such an account at the end of the chapter.

THE BOTTOM LINE?

The project as originally planned in 1986 could have transformed the economy of Roxbury. Although many of the originally hoped-for 5,000 jobs would have been filled by employees from other neighborhoods and towns, the influx of workers would have created demand for goods and services

during the working day and would have provided much-needed service establishments for the Roxbury neighborhood. The community benefits package would have provided millions of dollars for housing construction and business capital. The developer estimated that Roxbury and Chinatown would receive a total of \$26 million in community benefits. Also, if it is assumed that 5% of the jobs at Ruggles Center would be held by Roxbury residents, the project would have generated approximately \$8 million in annual payroll for Roxbury residents. If one uses the generally accepted multiplier for payroll, the project should have generated \$15 million in additional income for Roxbury businesses and residents. This additional \$23 million in annual income for Roxbury compares to the annual aggregate income of approximately \$351 million (1980 data, 1989 dollars). Thus if the Roxbury residents holding jobs at Ruggles Center had been previously unemployed, the project would have increased aggregate annual income by 7%. Even if Roxbury employees had not been new job-holders, the multiplier effect alone would have increased aggregate annual income by 4%. This 4-7% range does not include the community benefits package, nor the additional income that might have come from subsequent investment in the Roxbury area.¹

The project's impact would have been redistributive, for the community benefits and many of the jobs were targeted for the Roxbury community. These benefits would have come directly out of the developer's profits, so the payments to Roxbury would have represented a transfer of wealth from richer people to poorer people. The project also intended to provide minority developers with experience and equity in a downtown development, as well as legitimating the role of the Parcel 18 Task Force in forming development policy. While the actual effects of the project will not

be clear for years to come, the project as intended would have targeted economic and political benefits for Roxbury. Therefore, parcel-to-parcel linkage for the development of Parcel 18 must be considered a progressive policy.

The eventual effects of the policy remain uncertain, however, because the project has had such difficulty getting started. As of early spring 1992 the land is still vacant. Groundbreaking for the project is scheduled for later this spring, and the Registry of Motor Vehicles is scheduled to move to the site in 1993. There are no definite plans for the construction of the successive phases of the project, nor are there plans to begin the construction of the linked downtown project, One Lincoln Street. As noted in the previous chapter, the community benefits from Phase I of Ruggles Center are minimal. This first phase will create nearly \$400,000 in linkage payments, and it will bring 550 permanent jobs to the site. There are no committed or likely tenants for the building other than the Registry of Motor Vehicles. Until there are tenants for the remainder of Ruggles Center and for One Lincoln Street, the developer cannot receive financing to begin construction on those parts of the project.²

The most important determinant of the effects of parcel-to-parcel linkage was the late-1980's office market bust. The redistributive aspects of the project depend on office construction, both at Parcel 18 and downtown at the Kingston-Bedford site, and Parcel 18 proceeded as planned only as long as demand for office space in Boston was high. The BRA was able to find developers for the project because the construction of the downtown project was expected to be so profitable. The linkage program was designed to force a shift in the use of One Lincoln Street revenue from developer's profit to a mixture of developer's profit and community benefits for Roxbury. As

originally formulated, the community benefits would have come primarily from One Lincoln Street. From that project, the developer would have contributed \$10 million over ten years to the trust fund. The contribution from Ruggles Center would have been much smaller: 10% of net operating income after a return for the developer.

Currently, however, Phase I of the Ruggles Center project is not expected to generate net income above the level set aside as return for the developer. Phase I is therefore not expected to generate any community benefits. Even though the development of Phase I of Ruggles Center will go forward, most of the redistributive effects depend on the construction of One Lincoln Street. The apparent failure of the project to achieve its original redistributive goals is the starting point for the following theoretical discussion.

THE ECONOMIC CONSTRAINT THEORISTS HAVE THEIR SAY

The economic constraint theorists argue that economic constraints limit the effects of local policy. Redistributive effects are impossible, say Harvey, Friedman, and Peterson, because redistribution ultimately contradicts the economic imperatives that the city must follow.

The apparent failure of Parcel 18 supports many of the specific claims of the economic constraint theorists. For example, Harvey, the structural Marxist, argues that truly progressive policy comes only from wide-ranging social revolution. The capitalist state cannot formulate or achieve redistributive goals without the consent of capital. Redistribution rarely occurs because the capitalist state's primary role is to facilitate capitalist growth and to diffuse class struggle. For a structural Marxist, then, Parcel 18 must be seen as a pro-capitalist rather than a revolutionary policy. The

seemingly redistributive aspects of the project must be seen as nothing more than an accommodation of working class interests that permits the state to proceed with an inherently pro-capitalist policy.

According to such a view, the plan to develop Parcel 18 was essentially a plan to rechannel investment out of an overbuilt downtown. This rechanneling of capital might have averted a potential crisis that Boston would have faced if the escalating demand for office space continued to push up rents and drive smaller firms and employment in other sectors out of the city. (See table 4.) The development of Parcel 18 followed the pattern of destroying past investments to make room for new investment: homes and businesses along the Southwest Corridor had been destroyed in the 1960's and were planned to be replaced by office space in the 1980's, owned by larger-scale and out-of-town developers. Parcel 18 would have incorporated Roxbury into the larger capitalist system by extending the limits of the commercial office market into Roxbury to provide a new site for capital investment.

To continue the structural Marxist explanation: the city and state governments tried to facilitate capitalist expansion, but the slowdown in capital investment in the Boston office market made this extra site for investment unnecessary. With downtown office rents falling, fewer small firms and back-office operations were forced to leave downtown. The logic of capital no longer required the production of new space in Roxbury. Although the city and state governments continued with the project, there remained little hope for private investment in successive phases of the project.

The logic of capital resists even the premise of parcel-to-parcel linkage, that the profits from one project could subsidize another. As the developer said, while the city and state governments envisioned One Lincoln Street as subsidizing Ruggles Center, no private financier would ever accept the profits

from one project to guarantee a loan for another project. All along, the developer acted as if the Ruggles Center project would have to finance itself and satisfy the demands of its private investors. MCPV resisted Senator Owens's amendment because of the difficulty it would have had in getting a loan if the community benefits requirement were raised. The concerns of investors, then, limited the extent to which redistributive payments were possible. These concerns ultimately limited the progressive aspects of parcel-to-parcel linkage.

Structural Marxists would also say that to the extent that the project even appeared progressive, it simply diffused class struggle, demonstrating again that the project was anything but revolutionary. The involvement of a minority developer, they might say, was a form of accommodation by which Roxbury's economic leaders would be made partners in Boston's pro-capitalist leadership instead of pushing for more revolutionary change. As Harvey explains, urban capitalist leadership tends to emphasize place-based rather than class-based interests: linking Roxbury land to downtown land forced the appearance of a convergence of interests among different classes because the fate of the Roxbury economy became tied to the fates of local and national developers. This apparent convergence of workers' and developers' fortunes hid the true struggle between capitalists and workers and weakened any brewing threats to the capitalist system.

The apparent failure of Parcel 18 also fulfills some of Milton Friedman's prophecies about government activity. First, by his criteria, the project does appear to be a misallocation of public and private funds. Though downtown Boston is experiencing high vacancy rates and falling office rents, the Parcel 18 project involves the creation of more new office space. Under a free market, prices signal consumers and producers to change their behavior;

in the example of an office market, rising rents signal producers to build more office space while falling rents signal producers to build less space until rents rise or, at least, stop falling. But at Parcel 18, the political commitments made by the BRA, the City, and the Commonwealth inhibit them from responding to price signals. The government, with its ability to confer subsidies and to produce goods and services directly, can circumvent the free-market mechanism. Taxpayers will pay for the Registry's above-market rent at Parcel 18, and downtown land-owners can blame the city and state government for creating more office space and exacerbating the high vacancy rates and falling rents.

Second, Friedman claims that most government intervention is undertaken to correct past, misguided government action rather than to overcome market failures. The plan for Parcel 18 follows this pattern. Although Flynn said that the justification for the project was the sharing of downtown prosperity with neighborhoods to counteract the market's tendency to invest only in downtown, there was a more important reason for the development. Both Dukakis and Roxbury community leaders, including Reverend Bethel, emphasized the need to develop Parcel 18 as compensation for the demolition that Roxbury suffered when the Southwest Corridor was cleared for the proposed highway in the 1960's. While Flynn's interest in the development of Parcel 18 was part of a more generalized desire to unite neighborhood and downtown interests, Dukakis and Roxbury leaders had long-standing personal and political commitments to undo the previous damage done by the local and federal governments.

Peterson argues that the city's need to attract capital keeps redistributive policy off the local political agenda. More thoroughly than Harvey or Friedman, Peterson examines the specific workings of local policy

formulation. While other kinds of local policy are associated with particular political processes, he claims, there is no place for redistributive policy in local government. Redistributive policy generally cannot surface in local politics because of its necessarily detrimental effects on urban economic activity.

But while the history of Parcel 18 supports the economic constraint theorists' claims that redistributive effects are difficult to achieve, the history of Parcel 18 disproves their claim that cities cannot formulate truly progressive policy. Though the redistributive effects of parcel-to-parcel linkage have not yet been realized, the city of Boston was able to formulate this redistributive policy. Thus the economic constraint theorists go too far.

WHERE POLITICS MATTERED

The political coalition theorists succeed where the economic constraint theorists fail. These theorists argue that politicians' skills and ideologies are able to determine the shape of local policy. According to Swanstrom and Stone, progressive local ruling coalitions are the key to the formulation of progressive policy. Swanstrom even uses Mayor Flynn as the premier example of a populist mayor. Flynn's leadership, as well as Dukakis's and other politicians' skill and devotion, made the planning of Parcel 18's development possible.

For years before Flynn, Boston's office market boomed but no progressive development policy was formulated. The downtown office boom began during Mayor Kevin White's tenure, and office construction levels were as high in 1971 and 1975 as they were during most of the 1980's.³ Developers were willing to pay community benefits in order to develop land in Boston, as shown by the developer's concessions following the 1978 Copley Place protest. By that time in his tenure, though, Mayor White had come to

favor downtown development and centralized growth. The city's leadership had little interest in neighborhood growth in general or the Southwest Corridor development in particular. Thus the high demand for downtown office space did not automatically result in the formulation of a policy to share downtown wealth with the neighborhoods.

In the early and mid-1980's, when the BRA, the Dukakis administration, and the Parcel 18 Task Force planned the parcel-to-parcel linkage program, economic conditions were still favorable. Boston continued to experience an unprecedented downtown office boom, and demand for office space continued to rise. Rising rents made downtown development profitable, and the passage of Proposition 2 1/2 lowered the traditionally high property tax burden. Economically, Boston was still in a position to take advantage of the demand for office space.

The development of a parcel-to-parcel linkage program in the mid-1980's, therefore, is attributable partly to political skill and devotion. Unlike his predecessor, Governor Edward King, Dukakis had a long-standing desire to develop the Southwest Corridor as compensation for the earlier destruction along that land. He also had a long-standing commitment to mass transit, and he was eager to see the new Orange Line spur additional investment along its route. For Mayor Flynn, parcel-to-parcel linkage helped him solidify a political coalition that reelected him in 1987 and 1991. Parcel-to-parcel linkage was a response to criticism from Mel King, for instance, that Flynn ignored racial discrimination and acknowledged racial differences in standards of living only to the extent that they could be explained as class or economic differences. Flynn's responsiveness to the Parcel 18 Task Force's insistence on minority equity helped build a coalition of support for parcel-to-parcel linkage. While Roxbury representatives criticized the BRA for

excluding them in other development plans, few complaints were heard over the plan for Parcel 18. Considering the black community's lack of trust in the BRA, this was remarkable.

The formulation of parcel-to-parcel linkage was also aided by the city's experience with linkage payments. Recall that developers' objection to linkage payments quieted when they realized that linkage payments were a small percentage of costs and that these payments diffused opposition to new development. Flynn, then, had the support of developers and the minority community, as well as the white neighborhoods, for parcel-to-parcel linkage. With the possible exception of Mayor White in his early years, no other leader of Boston had formed a coalition of neighborhood and downtown interests. The history of Boston's development had often set these interests in opposition: under Curley, neighborhood development came at the expense of downtown, and under Hynes and Collins, downtown development came at the expense of the neighborhoods. Flynn's diverse support allowed him to overcome this antagonistic zero-sum game.

In addition to skilled political leadership and the city's experience with linkage payments, another important condition was the cooperation of state and city agencies. Because Parcel 18 was owned both by the city and the state, the cooperation of both administrations, as well as their respective agencies, was necessary for its development. For instance, the original plan for public subsidies involved a careful balance of city and state contributions, since each side wanted the other to assume a fair share of the burden. While these political conditions obviously could not guarantee that the development of Parcel 18 would proceed as planned, they were necessary for the successful planning of the project.

Even though the effects of Parcel 18's development may fall short of expectations, the successful formulation of the policy has some redistributive effects. The scaled-down project will bring some immediate economic benefits to Roxbury. Roxbury and Chinatown will benefit from linkage payments (albeit reduced ones) and a percentage of the developer's fee. Considering the factors that would discourage building an office complex in Roxbury today -- the fear of crime, the office market bust, the history of past disinvestment in Roxbury -- and the arguments that the economic constraint theorists make against the possibility of progressive local policy even under the best economic conditions, it is perhaps worthier of note that the development is proceeding at all, rather than that it is not proceeding as rapidly as originally hoped.

Yet while the political coalition theorists are useful in understanding how the parcel-to-parcel linkage policy was formulated for the development of Parcel 18, they cannot explain why the effects of the policy may not ultimately match its intentions. Their theories leave no room for the role of economic constraints in shaping the project's outcome. Instead, their focus on politics might lead them to give a political reason for the apparent failure of the project: the MWRA battle in the state legislature. The effects of this controversy on the project, however, are small when compared to the effects of the office market bust.

The politics of the MWRA battle ultimately had less effect on the development of Parcel 18 than one might guess from the political and public attention the battle received. Although the developer lost the MWRA as a tenant for Parcel 18, it then landed the Registry of Motor Vehicles only a year after the MWRA decided to stay in Charlestown, and the developer said that it had been talking to the Registry and other agencies all along. As described

in chapter 5, while the Registry will rent less space than the MWRA would have, and while the jobs offered by the Registry might not be as technical or professional, the Registry will bring more of the public to Parcel 18 and may support more ancillary services. Since the Registry is smaller than the MWRA, the housing linkage payments will be lower than expected. But housing linkage payments from Phase I are a small fraction of the community benefits package, so the community benefits, while delayed, will be reduced only slightly.

One might argue instead that the MWRA conflict hurt the development of Parcel 18 by delaying the project by two years: instead of having a tenant in May 1989, Parcel 18 did not have a tenant until November 1991. However, by 1989 the office market had already changed. Vacancy rates were already in double-digits, and property assessments had ended their previously rapid rise. Even if the developer had secured the MWRA as an anchor tenant in mid-1989, the demand for office space had already fallen enough to have made subsequent private investment as unlikely then as it is now.

RECONSTRUCTING URBAN THEORY

The history of Parcel 18, then, yields two observations. First, the most important factor in determining the effects of the linkage policy was an economic condition -- a slowdown in demand for office space. Second, the parcel-to-parcel linkage policy was established by a progressive local ruling coalition, rooted in a populist commitment to neighborhoods, local support, and intergovernmental cooperation. This leadership continues to try to develop Parcel 18 in the face of unfavorable economic conditions. Yet these two observations, considered together, present a difficulty for urban theory.

According to the theories under discussion, the two observations from Parcel 18 are logically inconsistent.

The solution to this problem, and my argument, is that the economic constraints on Parcel 18 were important, but these constraints functioned differently than Harvey, Friedman, and Peterson predict. The argument has three parts: first, the economic constraints on Parcel 18 were not "structural," but "conditional." In other words, these economic constraints were not universal or permanent, but instead they were based on actual, changing economic conditions. Second, the economic constraints on Parcel 18 were multidimensional, not singular. The multidimensionality of constraints on the project gave its planners the freedom to be creative in structuring the parcel-to-parcel linkage policy. Third, the set of constraints on Parcel 18, and on redistribution in general, are not necessarily the set of constraints on urban economic growth. To the extent that the sets of constraints are different, growth and redistribution can occur simultaneously.

The economic constraint theorists argue that economic constraints -- what Harvey refers to as the "logic of capital," and what Peterson refers to as the need to attract and enhance economic activity -- limit local government action and effectively preclude even the formulation of progressive policy, much less its success. Both Harvey and Peterson present a rather static view of the relative powers of capital and the state. They suggest that capital mobility is both carrot and stick for local governments: in prosperous times cities must prevent capital disinvestment, and in less prosperous times cities must attract capital investment. Parcel-to-parcel linkage imposes an additional cost on the developer of the downtown land by tying the neighborhood project and community benefits to the downtown

development. In this sense, the policy is anti-growth and anti-capital -- and therefore contradicts the theory of structural constraints.

Parcel 18 reveals that economic conditions can indeed limit the effects of progressive policy. Yet it is likely that when demand for downtown office space rises again, the construction of One Lincoln Street will begin and the bulk of the community benefits to Roxbury will be realized. While economic constraints will determine the ultimate effects of parcel-to-parcel linkage, these constraints are softer than the structural constraints that Harvey and Peterson discuss. The limits on the effectiveness of Parcel 18's development are conditional -- that is, the force of the economic constraints varies over time. These limitations are based on current economic conditions, rather than abstract economic forces, and are therefore temporary and changing rather than permanent or universal.

To replace the notion of structural constraints with the notion of conditional constraints may appear to be common sense. Even Peterson admits that were redistributive policies to arise, they would arise in cities that are in better fiscal health. But Peterson mentions this possibility only in passing, whereas the history of Parcel 18 suggests that it is central. If the economic conditions that shape policy results are conditional rather than structural, then a theoretical space for progressive policy opens, namely, when conditional constraints are less stringent.

Harvey would object. Even if the logic of capital occasionally permitted redistributive concessions, he would argue, long-lasting reform without revolution is impossible because the "forces of reaction" would eventually undo progressive reforms in order to squelch the rising expectations of the working class. This objection, however, presumes that the political climate

always and necessarily changes in lockstep with changing economic conditions.

The history of Parcel 18 suggests otherwise. While the planning began in the mid-1980's, political involvement and planning continued in the late 1980's and early 1990's, when the demand for office space had already slowed dramatically. Instead of halting their efforts when the office market bust began, political leaders increased their efforts to counteract economic forces. For instance, instead of abandoning Ruggles Center when the One Lincoln Street project soured, the state offered a new subsidy -- a higher-than-market rent to be paid by the Registry of Motor Vehicles -- to ensure that Phase I of the project would still be viable.

The remainder of the Ruggles Center development and One Lincoln Street are on hold, until economic conditions change again. But the policy that will pave the way for redistributive effects remains in place for when the economic climate improves and the realization of the policy's intent becomes possible. The development of Parcel 18 may yet achieve its original goals, in which case the benefits have only been delayed by the office market downturn, not eliminated. The plans to continue with parcel-to-parcel linkage suggest that specific progressive policies and coalitions enjoy a degree of autonomy. They do not necessarily fall when conditional constraints tighten, and they may persist intact until conditional constraints loosen and the policy's effects become feasible again.

Moreover, even if the parcel-to-parcel linkage policy had been abandoned, the political experience of planning this development will influence progressive land-use policy in the future. The BRA has won the trust of many Roxbury leaders, and Roxbury residents and developers have gained experience in policy planning and formulation. While conditional

constraints may preclude local progressive policy for the next few years, this political experience may be recalled when conditional constraints loosen and once again allow progressive policy formulation. The history of Parcel 18 itself shows that the politics of the past shape the politics of the future: the political pressure on the city and state administrations to develop Parcel 18 was so intense partly because of the Roxbury community's anger over the demolition of that land decades earlier.

The nature of political coalitions is, as Swanstrom and Stone argue, not predetermined. Though progressive policy goals are not always economically possible, the ideological basis of political coalitions and leaderships can determine if progressive policy will be achieved when it is possible. Under White in the late 1970's, a linkage policy was economically feasible, as the case of Copley Place showed. However, his favoritism toward downtown and his increasing emphasis on centralized growth precluded progressive land-use policy, even though conditional constraints were less stringent then than now. Flynn, in contrast, took advantage of these same loose conditional constraints to push for progressive land-use policy.

The experience of Parcel 18 prompts a second theoretical reformulation. Not only are the economic constraints on redistribution more accurately described as conditional rather than structural; Parcel 18 also suggests that cities face numerous economic constraints on redistribution, rather than a single constraint.

Recall that Harvey, Friedman, and Peterson suggest that city governments try to maximize a single goal. For Harvey the goal is the facilitation of capital expansion; for Friedman the goal is efficiency, which results in the maximization of aggregate wealth; and for Peterson the goal is enhancing economic activity. All argue that redistribution interferes with the

maximization of these respective goals, making redistribution ultimately anathema to the interests of the city. Their notions of a zero-sum game -- between capitalists and workers in Harvey; between developmental and redistributive policy in Peterson; and between efficiency and equity in Friedman -- reflect this construct of the singular economic constraint.

My argument is, to put it in mathematicians' terms, that cities' maximization of their residents' well-being is a multivariate-constraint problem rather than a single-constraint problem. One of these constraints on redistribution is property tax rates; others include levels of federal aid, non-tax revenue (like fees for services), and, in the case of Parcel 18, the demand for city-owned land.

History shows that these constraints are not necessarily equally strong at any given time, and that these constraints are somewhat independent of each other. The demand for Boston's downtown land rose in the 1960's and 1970's and stayed high throughout the 1980's, as reflected in the rapid office construction over those years. Over those years, the constraint of city-owned assets was less binding as the demand for downtown office space caused the value of city-owned land to rise. While this source of revenue was growing, though, the passage of Proposition 2 1/2 in 1979 and the reduction of federal aid in the early 1980's reimposed economic constraints that had, in earlier years, been loose. By the 1980's, there were more numerous and stringent conditional constraints than in the past, so the number of revenue sources available for redistributive purposes was dwindling.

Peterson would say that the low tax rates imposed by Proposition 2 1/2 would encourage economic growth but make redistribution impossible. Instead, though, the city government formulated a linkage program, (including both linkage payments and parcel-to-parcel linkage) that tied

redistributive benefits to the demand for downtown land, thus enabling the city to pursue redistribution in the face of externally-imposed low tax rates. In other words, Boston took advantage of the conditional constraint that was least binding at the time.

Therefore, politics matter to the extent that cities are able to choose among the conditional constraints that sometimes limit redistributive policy. Parcel-to-parcel linkage is creative: BRA director Stephen Coyle found a way to target development in a poor area without depending on dwindling grants or tax revenues. The success of progressive policies depends partly on the skill with which policy-makers can tie redistributive programs to different sources of revenue as conditional constraints become relatively looser and tighter. The rise of linkage payments in many cities, and of parcel-to-parcel linkage in Boston, demonstrates that policy innovation can expand the range of conditional constraints for cities to negotiate. With more conditional constraints to choose between, the likelihood of finding a relatively loose constraint rises, and the possibility of finding revenue for progressive policy grows.

Of course, conditional constraints have, at least for now, hurt the redistributive aims of Parcel 18, for most of the community benefits await the construction of One Lincoln Street downtown. The city currently is more limited in achieving its redistributive goals, as three conditional constraints on local redistribution -- federal aid, tax revenue, and the value of city-owned land -- are all tight. Under these conditions, Boston must wait for downtown office construction to resume. But the current state of conditional constraints does not doom city politics to be forever powerless to achieve redistributive goals.

My third argument is that the set of economic constraints on growth is not identical with the set of economic constraints on redistribution, and therefore growth and redistribution are not always mutually exclusive. Parcel 18 shows that growth and redistribution can be achieved simultaneously by a single policy. Recall the BRA's 1986 report on parcel-to-parcel linkage, which described the process by which the joint development of One Lincoln Street and Ruggles Center would add to the city's overall economy more than just the development of One Lincoln Street would. The report argued that new space at Parcel 18 would encourage smaller firms and back-office operations to stay within city limits instead of moving to suburban office centers. It is not the case, said Governor Dukakis's Secretary of Economic Affairs Alden Raine, that the development of Parcel 18 took public and private resources away from more profitable investments downtown. Downtown, Raine argued, had little new space for office construction. As a result, the rising demand for office space encouraged new construction out of the city but in locations close to downtown, like Lynn, Quincy, Malden, and North Cambridge. Thus to the extent that the development of Parcel 18 would have captured some of this overflow demand, it would have raised overall economic activity in Boston, while at the same time redistributing the benefits of that growth in favor of Roxbury.⁴

This convergence of growth and redistribution suggests that even though the opportunities for progressive local land-use policy are sometimes limited by economic conditions, they are considerably wider than Harvey, Friedman, and Peterson would allow. Economic conditions do not necessarily set growth and redistribution in opposition. Often, the conditional constraints that influence the level of growth are different than the conditional constraints that influence the level of redistribution that is

possible in a city. This case study is evidence for the argument that the conditional constraints on growth are sometimes different than the conditional constraints on redistribution.

An econometric study by Dennis Carlton provides further evidence. Carlton's study of firms' location decisions disputes Harvey's and Peterson's claims that local government is able to influence capital flows and attract investment. According to the study, new firms and branch plants base location decisions primarily on energy costs, the skill level of local workers, wage levels, and the amount of business activity already in the area (known as "agglomeration economies"). Carlton reports that "it is certainly not evident that taxes provide strong deterrents to locational activity," and that explicit government policies to maintain a "favorable 'business climate'" have little effect on economic growth.⁵ It is possible that government policy may nonetheless affect business location within metropolitan regions, since this study focused only on interregional location decisions. The study does suggest, however, that the competition between cities for capital, which Harvey and Peterson emphasize, is driven by economic considerations other than government taxes and subsidies.

The economic constraints on local growth probably include, therefore, energy prices and unit labor costs, rather than property tax rates and developer contributions. In contrast, redistribution is limited by the level of city revenue, so the constraints on redistribution include intergovernmental grants, property taxes, and the value of city-owned land. No longer must growth depend on conditions that limit redistribution.

The different sets of conditional constraints on growth and redistribution allow for the possibility of progressive local land-use policy. Redistribution does not necessarily scare away economic growth, because the

tools for redistribution and the tools for growth overlap only partially. Linkage changes the relationship between growth and redistribution, such that both become possible. Perhaps extremely high property tax rates or developer exactions would measurably discourage investment and put a city at a competitive disadvantage -- so Boston should not tie the development of entire neighborhoods to a small downtown parcel of land. But parcel-to-parcel linkage was not kept off Boston's agenda for fear of scaring capital away.

The development of Parcel 18 represents a challenge to urban theories of prohibitive structural constraints and a rebuke to theories that ignore economic conditions. Economic forces, often beyond a city's control, shape the outcome of local land-use policies, while at times offering city politics the freedom to formulate progressive policies that could have long-lasting redistributive benefits. The above analysis opens a question for further study and observation, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this case study: to the extent that local economic growth is determined by forces beyond the control of local governments, might local politics actually be better suited to promote redistribution than to promote growth? Even if the answer is "no," the question itself may inspire urban policy-makers to reconsider the pro-growth and anti-redistributive stance that characterizes most American local policy, acknowledged by even those theorists who believe progressive local policy is possible.⁶ If the attempt to develop Parcel 18 can inspire this sort of reflection, its progressive effects may spread far beyond Roxbury and the people it will help most.

CHAPTER ONE NOTES

¹Alden Raine, personal interview, 24 Jan. 1992.

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³Harvey 6-11.

⁴Harvey 12-16.

⁵Harvey 25.

⁶Harvey 19.

⁷Harvey 29.

⁸Harvey 30.

⁹Harvey 126 and 155.

¹⁰Harvey 125-6.

¹¹Harvey 126.

¹²Harvey 31.

¹³Harvey 127, 163, and 175.

¹⁴Harvey 31.

¹⁵Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, introduction, The Politics of Social Policy in the United States, eds. Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) 17.

¹⁶Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, eds. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 1976) 25.

¹⁷Joseph Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988) 61-63.

¹⁸Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) 4, 9, and 27.

¹⁹Friedman 21-3.

²⁰Friedman 28-32.

²¹Stiglitz 71-80.

Chapter One Notes, continued

²²Friedman 166.

²³Stiglitz 90-91.

²⁴Friedman 173, 176, and 195.

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CHAPTER SIX NOTES

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APPENDIX: SOME REAL ESTATE TERMS

This section draws heavily on the BRA 1986 Interim Report and the Juan-Carlos Loveluck interview.

"Gross rent" versus "net rent":

Gross rent refers to the amount per square foot per year that a tenant pays to a landlord, including operating expenses, linkage payments, and taxes. Net rent excludes operating expenses, linkage payments, and taxes. Table 7 reports gross rent, while rent data in the text refer exclusively to net rent. The general rule for these data is that gross rent exceeds net rent by \$7 to \$10 per square foot.

"Asking rent" versus "effective rent":

Asking rent is what landlords advertise for vacant space. Effective rent is the level of rent that the landlord and the tenant negotiate. Table 7 reports asking rent, while rent data in the text refer usually to effective rent. Effective rent is generally 10% to 30% below asking rent.

"Cash-on-cash return" versus "return on total development cost":

Cash-on-cash return is equal to net operating income less financing costs (per year), divided by the initial investment (equity). Return on total development costs is equal to net operating income (per year) divided by total development cost (equity plus debt). In the text, I always distinguish the two ways to calculate return.

NOTE ON SOURCES

For the history of Parcel 18, I relied primarily on personal interviews and the Boston Globe. The other major local daily newspaper, the Boston Herald, provided additional information. The Globe followed the history more closely and printed over 200 relevant articles, and Globe articles are indexed both on computer and on hard copy. The Herald is not indexed, and its research department allowed me to go through their clip files. The Herald had printed only 25 relevant articles. Furthermore, while the Globe articles were often written by the same reporters, the Herald articles were written by a range of reporters, suggesting that the Herald did not have people consistently covering the project. Thus I relied on the Globe. Fortunately, the Globe's account was regularly confirmed by information from my interviews.

Many of the documents I used are unpublished. When appropriate, I list in the works cited the location of the document (e.g. BRA library, Paul Harold's files). For published Boston Redevelopment Authority reports, I give their publication number for easier reference.

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